The Heritage Foundation has posted the video of last month's event on US energy exports. The video is here and embedded below. (I start around 53:00, if you're just desperate to watch me wave my arms around like a crazyperson.)
Enjoy!
My personal blog about international trade, public policy & politics, pop culture, and stuff that probably interests only me
Showing posts with label Exports. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Exports. Show all posts
Tuesday, August 12, 2014
Video: Heritage Event on Energy Exports
Labels:
Energy,
Export Controls,
Exports,
Self-promotion
Monday, July 21, 2014
Announcements
Although this blog has gone pretty quiet over the last few months (an understatement, I know), I've been keeping busy with plenty of (non-toddler-related) stuff, including--
This Thursday, July 24, I'll be speaking at the Heritage Foundation at an event on "Energy Exports and Free Trade." The lineup for the event is (if I do say so myself) pretty stellar, and the subject matter couldn't be more timely. Here's the description:
This Thursday, July 24, I'll be speaking at the Heritage Foundation at an event on "Energy Exports and Free Trade." The lineup for the event is (if I do say so myself) pretty stellar, and the subject matter couldn't be more timely. Here's the description:
Expanding domestic energy production over the past few years has provided a welcome boost to the American economy. The federal government, however, has constrained the economic benefits by significantly limiting companies’ ability to trade energy freely around the world. Join as Congressman Cory Gardner (R-CO) leads a discussion in how open energy markets will create more opportunities for Americans, promote economic prosperity at home and abroad.
The speakers include me, Rep. Gardner, Jamie Webster (Senior Director, Global Oil Markets, IHS), Ross Eisenberg (Vice President, Energy and Resources Policy, National Association of Manufacturers), and Heritage's Nick Loris. You can register for the event, or watch it livestream online, here. Hope you can join us.
This Fall, I'll be a Senior Visiting Lecturer at Duke Law School teaching a course on International Trade Law. Unlike last semester's political science course, the syllabus for this class isn't really something worth viewing online (it's a lot of textbook stuff). But here's the course description:
International trade and the World Trade Organization attract a lot of attention and debate. Why do almost all economists say that liberalizing trade flows is a good thing? Why do politicians – even ones who purportedly support free markets – often rail against import competition and “unfair trade”? How does trade liberalization interact with other public policy choices such as protecting the environment or promoting the economic development of poor countries? In this course, we will examine why the WTO exists, how it developed from the GATT and how it fits in the international economic order (Part I). The course will offer you an in-depth, practical knowledge of substantive WTO law drawing heavily on case law. It will address the basic principles of trade in goods and trade in services, as well as some of the more specialized WTO agreements on, for example on trade remedies (subsidies, anti-dumping and safeguards). From a more procedural side, the course will pay close attention to the unique WTO mechanism for the solution of global trade disputes, with special reference again to recent and ongoing cases (Part II). It will conclude by examining U.S. trade law – particularly the widely-used trade remedies laws – and assessing not only the practice of international trade law in the United States, but also whether these laws actually achieve their supposed policy objectives (Part III). Although this course will necessarily address key principles and theories undergirding the international trade law system, one of its driving themes will be the actual practice of this discipline in the United States and at the WTO. The course will be graded based on class participation and an open-book final exam.
Registration is open now, so if you know any Duke law students, please send them my way.
Finally, I've still been writing on non-trade policy stuff over at The Federalist. Hope you'll scan it, as well as all the other good content over there, when you get a chance.
(Oh, and as for that toddler, she's just awesome.)
Finally, I've still been writing on non-trade policy stuff over at The Federalist. Hope you'll scan it, as well as all the other good content over there, when you get a chance.
(Oh, and as for that toddler, she's just awesome.)
Labels:
Energy,
Exports,
Heritage Foundation,
Self-promotion
Tuesday, April 22, 2014
Archaic US Trade Policies Inflate Gas Prices, Enrich Cronies
Cross-posted on Cato's blog:
The summer driving season is still weeks away, but rising U.S. gas prices are already back in the news. Last week, the average price for regular gasoline at U.S. gas stations hit $3.6918 a gallon – the highest since March 22, 2013 and up 43 cents this year. Much of this price depends on global supply and demand, but certainly not all of it. In fact, two archaic, little-known U.S. policies – vigorously defended by the well-connected interest groups who benefit from them – restrict free trade in petroleum products and, as a result, force American consumers to pay considerably more at the pump.
First, the Jones Act - a 94-year-old law that requires all domestic seaborne trade to be shipped on U.S.-crewed, -owned, flagged and manufactured vessels – prevents cost-effective intrastate shipping of crude oil or refined products. According to Bloomberg, there are only 13 ships that can legally move oil between U.S. ports, and these ships are “booked solid.” As a result, abundant oil supplies in the Gulf Coast region cannot be shipped to other U.S. states with spare refinery capacity. And, even when such vessels are available, the Jones Act makes intrastate crude shipping artificially expensive. According to a 2012 report by the Financial Times, shipping U.S. crude from Texas to Philadelphia cost more than three times as much as shipping the same product on a foreign-flagged vessel to a Canadian refinery, even though the latter route is longer.
It doesn’t take an energy economist to see how the Jones Act’s byzantine protectionism leads to higher prices at the pump for American drivers. According to one recent estimate, revoking the Jones Act would reduce U.S. gasoline prices by as much as 15 cents per gallon “by increasing the supply of ships able to shuttle the fuel between U.S. ports.”
Some of these costs could potentially be mitigated if it weren’t for the second U.S. trade policy inflating gas prices: restrictions on crude oil exports. As I wrote for Cato last year, current U.S. law – implemented in the 1970s during a bygone era of energy scarcity and dependence – effectively bans the exportation of U.S. crude oil to any country other than Canada. Because U.S. and Canadian refinery capacity is finite, America’s newfound energy abundance has led to a glut of domestic oil and caused domestic crude oil prices (West Texas Intermediate and Louisiana Light Sweet) to drop well below their global (Brent) counterpart. One might think that this price divergence would mean lower U.S. gas prices, but such thinking fails to understand that U.S. gasoline exports may be freely exported, and that gasoline prices are set on global markets based on Brent crude prices. As a result, several recent analyses – including ones by Citigroup [$], Resources for the Future and the American Petroleum Institute - have found that liberalization of U.S. crude oil exports would lower, not raise, gas prices by as much as 7 cents per gallon.
Thus, the Jones Act and the crude oil export ban – each implemented decades ago – together inflate U.S. gasoline prices by as much as 0.22 per gallon – or about 6% of the current price at your local gas station. Not everyone in the United States, however, is harmed. In the case of the Jones Act, the American shipping unions and shipbuilders that benefit from the law have long opposed any type of reforms, regardless of the pains imposed on the American economy and U.S. consumers. The crude oil export restrictions, on the other hand, have found new support from a small group of U.S. refiners who profit handsomely from depressed domestic crude prices and the lack of any legal limits on their exports. As is always the case with protectionism, these groups win and U.S. consumers lose.
Given this political dynamic, reform of either law appears unlikely in the near future, regardless of how dramatically the U.S. trade and energy landscape has changed since the laws were imposed. So the next time you fill up the tank, note that about 6 percent of your bill pads the bottom lines of a few well-connected cronies.
The summer driving season is still weeks away, but rising U.S. gas prices are already back in the news. Last week, the average price for regular gasoline at U.S. gas stations hit $3.6918 a gallon – the highest since March 22, 2013 and up 43 cents this year. Much of this price depends on global supply and demand, but certainly not all of it. In fact, two archaic, little-known U.S. policies – vigorously defended by the well-connected interest groups who benefit from them – restrict free trade in petroleum products and, as a result, force American consumers to pay considerably more at the pump.
First, the Jones Act - a 94-year-old law that requires all domestic seaborne trade to be shipped on U.S.-crewed, -owned, flagged and manufactured vessels – prevents cost-effective intrastate shipping of crude oil or refined products. According to Bloomberg, there are only 13 ships that can legally move oil between U.S. ports, and these ships are “booked solid.” As a result, abundant oil supplies in the Gulf Coast region cannot be shipped to other U.S. states with spare refinery capacity. And, even when such vessels are available, the Jones Act makes intrastate crude shipping artificially expensive. According to a 2012 report by the Financial Times, shipping U.S. crude from Texas to Philadelphia cost more than three times as much as shipping the same product on a foreign-flagged vessel to a Canadian refinery, even though the latter route is longer.
It doesn’t take an energy economist to see how the Jones Act’s byzantine protectionism leads to higher prices at the pump for American drivers. According to one recent estimate, revoking the Jones Act would reduce U.S. gasoline prices by as much as 15 cents per gallon “by increasing the supply of ships able to shuttle the fuel between U.S. ports.”
Some of these costs could potentially be mitigated if it weren’t for the second U.S. trade policy inflating gas prices: restrictions on crude oil exports. As I wrote for Cato last year, current U.S. law – implemented in the 1970s during a bygone era of energy scarcity and dependence – effectively bans the exportation of U.S. crude oil to any country other than Canada. Because U.S. and Canadian refinery capacity is finite, America’s newfound energy abundance has led to a glut of domestic oil and caused domestic crude oil prices (West Texas Intermediate and Louisiana Light Sweet) to drop well below their global (Brent) counterpart. One might think that this price divergence would mean lower U.S. gas prices, but such thinking fails to understand that U.S. gasoline exports may be freely exported, and that gasoline prices are set on global markets based on Brent crude prices. As a result, several recent analyses – including ones by Citigroup [$], Resources for the Future and the American Petroleum Institute - have found that liberalization of U.S. crude oil exports would lower, not raise, gas prices by as much as 7 cents per gallon.
Thus, the Jones Act and the crude oil export ban – each implemented decades ago – together inflate U.S. gasoline prices by as much as 0.22 per gallon – or about 6% of the current price at your local gas station. Not everyone in the United States, however, is harmed. In the case of the Jones Act, the American shipping unions and shipbuilders that benefit from the law have long opposed any type of reforms, regardless of the pains imposed on the American economy and U.S. consumers. The crude oil export restrictions, on the other hand, have found new support from a small group of U.S. refiners who profit handsomely from depressed domestic crude prices and the lack of any legal limits on their exports. As is always the case with protectionism, these groups win and U.S. consumers lose.
Given this political dynamic, reform of either law appears unlikely in the near future, regardless of how dramatically the U.S. trade and energy landscape has changed since the laws were imposed. So the next time you fill up the tank, note that about 6 percent of your bill pads the bottom lines of a few well-connected cronies.
Labels:
Cronyism,
Energy,
Energy Independence,
Exports,
Jones Act
Wednesday, February 12, 2014
Oil & Gas Exports Event: Video and Materials (and Two Important Updates)
If you weren't lucky enough to hear me, Mark Perry and Jim Bacchus opine on the "shale revolution" and the myriad problems with current US policy on oil and gas exports, you're in luck: Cato just posted the video, which is also imbedded below.
If you'd like a closer look at Mark's or my presentation, you can download them here and here, respectively. They remain up to date, except for two big developments that warrant mention:
If you'd like a closer look at Mark's or my presentation, you can download them here and here, respectively. They remain up to date, except for two big developments that warrant mention:
- First, a few minutes after the Cato event ended, Senator Ted Cruz announced a comprehensive energy plan, one of the core planks of which is the liberalzation of both crude oil and natural gas exports. (Boy, we were effective!) Cruz also will be sponsoring formal legislation to implement the plan in the coming days. Shortly thereafter, Senator Rand Paul stated his opposition to the current export restrictions. Thus, there now is a more robust reform proposal on the table in Congress and, soon, legislation along those lines. This is a far more ambitious approach than any before it, including that hinted by Senator Murkowski last month. Thus, it seems like Congress may be catching up to the rest of the policy and business world far more quickly than we imagined just a few short weeks ago. Giddyup.
- Second, the non-partisan outfit Resources for the Future published an extensive new study which, echoing previous studies, finds that eliminating the current restrictions on US crude oil exports would lower - yes lower - domestic gasoline prices. Here's the money line: "Given our projections for the change in crude oil prices and increased efficiency in refinery operations [caused by lifting the crude oil restrictions], we estimate US gasoline prices would be reduced by 2.8 to 6.9 cents per gallon." This, of course, makes perfect sense if you understand domestic and global oil markets, current US policy (which permits unlimited exports of refined petroleum products), and, well, basic economics. (See my Cato presentation for more.)
Labels:
Energy,
Energy Independence,
Export Controls,
Exports,
Self-promotion
Tuesday, January 7, 2014
Are Liberalized US Crude Oil Exports Finally on the Horizon?
As I mentioned a few weeks ago, a large segment of the energy policy world has suddenly realized that America's archaic crude oil export restrictions are really, really bad policy. But things have just been kicked into an even higher gear with two new developments:
Second, while API's support is obviously a big deal, there will undoubtedly be intense opposition to any reform efforts. As the National Journal reported yesterday, some uninformed politicians and certain domestic refiners - who benefit greatly from the ban - have already come out against reform. Combine that opposition with the inevitable push-back from fossil fuel-averse environmentalists who, in John Podesta, now have a sympathetic ear in the White House, and you have a recipe for a big political battle in Washington and diminished hopes for quick resolution to this problem. (Indeed, that Podesta's former digs, the Center for American Progress, immediately "blasted" Sen. Murkowski's remarks may be a good indication of what he's thinking.)
In short, crude oil exports could end up being like KeystoneXL or natural gas exports all over again - a frustrating and cripplingly slow process that's subject not to rational market forces but the mercurial whims of our political class.
And, make no mistake, the crude oil situation really is a problem. As I've repeatedly noted over the last year, the current export restrictions raise a host of legal, economic and policy concerns:
If it ever is.
- In a much-publicized speech today, Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), ranking member of the Senate Energy Committee, advocated modernizing US policies for energy exports, particularly natural gas and crude oil. Accompanying her speech was a new white paper on the same topic, which (among other things) highlights the serious economic problems caused by the current crude oil export licensing system (which is effectively a ban on exports to all countries except Canada), confirms the growing economic consensus that exports won't cause higher gas prices, and recommends that the President, the Commerce Department or (if the first two continue to do nothing) Congress relax the ban. Just as importantly, Murkowski's views were recently echoed by Sen. Mary Landrieu, (D-LA) who stands to take over the Senate Energy Committee this year. That means that we could have bi-partisan support for easing the US crude oil ban on the Senate committee arguably most integral to any such reforms.
- Also today, the American Petroleum Institute's President and CEO Jack Gerard reiterated his organization's support for lifting the crude oil export ban:
API's Jack Gerard on US crude exports: "action should be taken" to free oil trade. "It's time for a change of mentality" #SOAE2014
Gerards's formal announcement echoes a few previous statements from folks at API (which is the largest US energy trade association and a big player on Capitol Hill) and is a good sign that they're going to push harder on this issue in the future. (API's related blog post, which calls the crude export ban "obsolete," certainly indicates as much.)
— Ed Crooks (@Ed_Crooks) January 7, 2014
Second, while API's support is obviously a big deal, there will undoubtedly be intense opposition to any reform efforts. As the National Journal reported yesterday, some uninformed politicians and certain domestic refiners - who benefit greatly from the ban - have already come out against reform. Combine that opposition with the inevitable push-back from fossil fuel-averse environmentalists who, in John Podesta, now have a sympathetic ear in the White House, and you have a recipe for a big political battle in Washington and diminished hopes for quick resolution to this problem. (Indeed, that Podesta's former digs, the Center for American Progress, immediately "blasted" Sen. Murkowski's remarks may be a good indication of what he's thinking.)
In short, crude oil exports could end up being like KeystoneXL or natural gas exports all over again - a frustrating and cripplingly slow process that's subject not to rational market forces but the mercurial whims of our political class.
And, make no mistake, the crude oil situation really is a problem. As I've repeatedly noted over the last year, the current export restrictions raise a host of legal, economic and policy concerns:
- Original Cato paper on America's crude oil and natural gas licensing systems (and their economic, legal and policy concerns).
- Cato podcast on the need for free trade in energy.
- Reuters oped on the specific trade and economic problems caused by the US crude oil ban.
Oil is a global commodity; therefore, the global supply-demand balance is the primary driver of its price. However, transportation and refining capacity affect local pricing, which is what we as producers care about. The first red flag was pipeline capacity from the Permian to the Gulf Coast. While Permian oil production has risen from 850,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2007 to an estimated 1.3 million bpd currently, the five inland refineries buying our crude have a capacity of approximately 410,000 bpd. That means almost 900,000 bpd needs to find its way to the Gulf Coast refining complex that stretches from Corpus Christi to New Orleans, or to Cushing, most of which ends up in the Gulf Coast. There is 450,000 bpd of pipeline capacity from Midland to Cushing, and once the four pipeline projects are all completed in 2015, almost 1.5 million bpd of capacity from the Permian to the Gulf Coast will be in service. Problem solved.If the US government were smart, it would pursue the first option - completely lifting the ban on crude oil exports - as soon as possible. Doing so would restore a little sanity to US energy policy (although more definitely needs to be done), and provide ample benefits for the economy. However, if the aforementioned concerns and the government's track record with KeystoneXL and natural gas exports are any indication, US energy producers, consumers and market more broadly may endure a lot more pain before any serious, long-term solution is implemented.
Well, not so fast. The problem is that refiners, including Shell/Pemex, Lyondell/CITCO, Exxon Mobil, and Valero, spent billions of dollars each primarily in the 1990s, as domestic sweet production declined, to modify their refineries to process heavy, sour crude from sources including Mexico (Maya), Venezuela (Orinoco), and Saudi heavy-sour. It is not coincidental that Pemex, CITCO (Venezuela), and Aramco (Saudi Arabia) formed joint ventures with refiners in the Gulf Coast in the 1990s to secure outlets for their poorer quality crude. It will cost hundreds of millions to convert each refinery back to sweet service, and the EPA is unlikely to approve a permit for a new refinery in the United States. It remains to be seen whether refiners will invest money to switch back to sweet service, but rest assured they will want a price that is competitive with the heavy sour grades from our Latin neighbors and the Middle East.
E&P companies have long dealt with gas-on-gas competition. Our industry drilled and developed natural gas so efficiently that we drove the price of gas down to a point where drilling for gas was marginal except in the most prolific plays in the best locations relative to consumer markets (e.g., the Marcellus). In addition, the Permian Basin and Eagle Ford have long suffered a glut of NGLs, especially ethane, the lightest and lowest valued component of the NGL stream. In 3+ years, the construction of ethane crackers and olefins complexes in the Gulf Coast for the export of products ranging from ethylene and propylene to plastics and fabrics will help alleviate the NGL glut. Between now and then, “Houston, we have a problem,”–a glut of NGLs.
The same phenomena will occur with the light, sweet crude oil and condensate that is produced from the Eagle Ford, Wolfcamp, and Leonard-aged formations that include the Bone Spring, Spraberry, and Avalon. The price at the wellhead in the Permian will likely be $10-30 per barrel below that of Brent crude, the new global benchmark for oil prices. The price of Brent or WTI Cushing will be irrelevant to Permian or Eagle Ford producers, as it will take discounting to induce an oversupplied sweet refinery to take one producer’s crude over another’s.
There are at least three market-based solutions to this quandary. One, the federal government should lift its ban on exports of crude oil. There are simple, “tea kettle” refineries in Mexico and other Central and Latin American countries that would buy our sweet crude if permitted to do so. We, in turn, import heavy, sour Latin crude to be processed in our complex Gulf Coast refineries. This amounts to a crude swap with our Latin neighbors. Two, refiners invest billions in the aggregate to convert their refineries back to sweet service. The impediment to this strategy is the fact that most of the incremental oil to be developed outside the U.S. is heavy sour, whose producers are willing to discount and enter long-term contracts to sell it. Three, prices fall into the $70s or worse at the wellhead and the investment and the rig count drops, reducing oil production, alleviating the problem. You see, E&P companies primarily reinvest their cash flow into leasehold, drilling, and completions. Few of the most active drillers in the United States pay a dividend.
Lower oil and gas prices mean lower cash flow and reduced rates of return on investment, thus reduced reinvestment, and slower production growth. It is a brutal self-correction mechanism that would have worked for natural gas if not for the large amounts of rich associated gas produced with the oil in our unconventional plays. None of us hopes to resort to the third option.
If it ever is.
Friday, December 6, 2013
American Media Finally Starting to Notice the Problems Caused by US Export Restrictions on Oil & Gas
Decades-old US laws currently prevent the free exportation of
American crude oil and natural gas, thus raising a host of economic, legal and
policy problems. This is not a good
thing, but it fortunately appears that the stalwart American media are starting
to notice. Unfortunately, it took them a
heckuva long time to do it, as two recent news stories make clear.
First, several media outlets picked up a new National Association of Manufacturers analysis which finds that US natural gas export restrictions likely violate WTO rules. This Reuters clip is pretty indicative of the media coverage:
Second, the Wall Street Journal reported this week that startling increases in US crude oil production, combined with onerous export restrictions, have led to a glut of domestic oil, a host of potential problems for domestic oil producers and newfound focus on the 1970s era export law:
Sour grapes aside, these news items raise two far-more-important points. First, it’s good to see that the media are finally, after only a year, catching on to the many unnecessary problems created by US oil and gas export restrictions. Hopefully, they’ll keep at it (even if they continue to ignore me).
Second, and maybe more obviously, these export restrictions – dating back, in the case of gas, to the 1930s! – are causing serious, serious problems for the United States: distorting energy markets, eliminating jobs, depressing economic growth, creating global trade frictions and undermining other, worthwhile US government policies. They reflect a bygone era of US energy homogeneity and scarcity.
Isn’t it time that our laws – and our political leaders – caught up?
First, several media outlets picked up a new National Association of Manufacturers analysis which finds that US natural gas export restrictions likely violate WTO rules. This Reuters clip is pretty indicative of the media coverage:
A lobbying group pressing the U.S. government to speed approval of U.S. natural gas and coal export proposals released a report on Tuesday contending that long delays in the approval process may violate global trade rules.
The National Association of Manufacturers commissioned James Bacchus, a former Democratic Congressman and World Trade Organization judge, to pen the report, which it says sends a message to the Obama administration and Congress that they should accelerate the approval process and lift regulatory barriers…
The NAM asked Bacchus to consider whether delays by the Department of Energy in issuing licenses to export liquefied natural gas to certain countries violate obligations under World Trade Organization rules.
In the report Bacchus concluded that both actions violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which forbids export restrictions. "The United States has always been a strong advocate of rules that forbid export restrictions and has been forceful in challenging export restrictions imposed by other countries," said Bacchus, warning that "the tables may be turned on the United States directly in the WTO."NAM and Bacchus are right to raise this issue (and on the legal merits), and it’s good to see the media report the problem. However, it’s surprising that this new analysis is treated as some sort of revelation, given that a certain Cato Institute scholar first warned of the WTO and other policy problems surrounding the natural gas export system (and a similar one for crude oil) almost ten months ago:
Beyond the economic problems, both export licensing systems raise serious concerns under global trade rules. First, the U.S. export licensing regimes for natural gas and crude oil likely violate U.S. obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Under GATT Article XI:1, WTO Members are generally prohibited from imposing quantitative restrictions on imports and exports. Under Article XI and related WTO jurisprudence, “discretionary” licensing systems (i.e., those in which the administering authority has the freedom to grant or deny a license) and systems in which applications are delayed for several months constitute impermissible restrictions on export quantities. On the other hand, licensing systems in which approval is automatic and relatively quick (e.g., five days) have been found to be lawful.Another think tank expert came to similar conclusions around the same time. Thus, these legal concerns have been pretty common knowledge now for quite a while (and originally weren’t pushed by a “lobbying group”). It’s really odd that they’re today being treated as novel.
Based on these standards, both the U.S. natural gas and crude oil licensing systems appear to violate GATT Article XI:1. Each system provides the administering agency (DOE or BIS) with the discretion to grant or deny an export license based on subjective and nonbinding criteria (the “public interest” or “national interest” standards). Moreover, the pending export license applications have been delayed for several months (and, in a few cases, years). Both of these facts support findings of GATT violations.
Second, the Wall Street Journal reported this week that startling increases in US crude oil production, combined with onerous export restrictions, have led to a glut of domestic oil, a host of potential problems for domestic oil producers and newfound focus on the 1970s era export law:
The U.S. Gulf Coast—home to the world's largest concentration of petroleum refineries—is suddenly awash in crude oil. So much high-quality U.S. oil is flowing into the area that the price of crude there has dropped sharply in the past few weeks and is no longer in sync with global prices. In fact, some experts believe a U.S. oil glut is coming. "We are moving toward a significant amount of domestic oversupply of light crude," says Ed Morse, head of commodities research at Citigroup….
And the glut on the Gulf Coast is likely to grow. In January, the southern leg of TransCanada Corp.'s Keystone pipeline is set to begin transporting 700,000 barrels a day of crude from the storage tanks of Cushing, Okla., to Port Arthur, Texas.
The ramifications could be far-reaching, including lower gasoline prices for American drivers, rising profits for refineries and growing political pressure on Congress to allow oil exports. But the glut could also hurt the very companies that helped create it: independent drillers, who have reversed years of declining U.S. energy production but face lower prices for their product….
"Not one person saw this coming," says Paul Sankey, an energy analyst at Deutsche Bank. He says he expects growing production to eventually push prices of West Texas Intermediate crude, the U.S. benchmark, below $80 a barrel, down from $97.38 Thursday. The industry "will start screaming" for Congress to lift the export moratorium, he says.
Adam Bedard, a market analyst for High Sierra Energy, a subsidiary of NGL Energy Partners, agrees that pressure will rise on the federal government to loosen crude-oil export restrictions, which date back to the 1973 OPEC oil embargo. Oil storage in the Gulf region appears to be filling up, he says. "It's like someone built a superhighway where there wasn't one before."Again, the WSJ should be commended for highlighting this important story and the serious economic and legal problems caused by US export restrictions on crude oil. However, it’s laughable to say that “not one person saw this coming.” Indeed, that very same Cato scholar warned of this problem back in February:
[B]y depressing domestic prices and subjecting export approval to the whims of government bureaucrats, the U.S. licensing systems retard domestic energy production, discourage investment in the oil and gas sectors, and destabilize the domestic energy market. Artificially low prices prevent producers from achieving a sustainable rate of return on the massive up-front costs required to drill and extract oil and gas, and investors lack any assurances under the discretionary licensing systems that domestic prices will not collapse when output increases. Such concerns have led the IEA to recently warn that U.S. export restrictions put the “American oil boom” at risk.This modern day Nostradamus then drilled down (pun intended!) on the problem for Reuters in June:
[A] bipartisan swath of federal and state officials is pressing for new infrastructure, like the Keystone XL pipeline, to move a glut of domestic oil from the center of North America to Gulf ports. This is a crucial step, but unless Congress reforms archaic restrictions on crude oil exports, all that black gold’s going nowhere….
[B]y curtailing exports and subjecting license approvals to the whims of bureaucrats, the current system slows domestic production, breeds economic distortions, discourages investment and destabilizes energy markets.
U.S. oil producers, for example, lose an estimated $10 billion a year due to their inability to sell crude in foreign markets. They’ve also spent hundreds of millions of dollars building “mini-refineries” in the Midwest and Gulf region to circumvent the current restrictions and export a slightly processed, cheaper product — leaving another $1.7 billion in potential profit on the table.
As Rube-Goldbergian as this sounds, producers have few alternatives, given that U.S. oil consumption has collapsed in recent years and building new refinery capacity is virtually impossible in many “environmentally friendly” states. These problems prompted the head of the International Energy Agency to warn recently that U.S. export restrictions put the “American oil boom” at risk….
Given these problems, it’s clear that the current crude oil export licensing system needs to go. Congressional supporters of the U.S. energy boom must lead the charge.Sounds familiar, eh? If only there were some sort of “search engine” or something that would allow curious journalists to find such things on the internet. Alas, maybe next year.
If advocates really want to develop our vast energy resources and expand the economy, they should craft a licensing policy that reflects the new energy landscape and the immense U.S. export potential. They’d also be restoring some overall coherence to U.S. trade and energy policy — and avoiding potentially embarrassing trade conflicts. If they ignore these restrictions, and their many flaws, the nascent U.S. oil boom could be snuffed out.
Sour grapes aside, these news items raise two far-more-important points. First, it’s good to see that the media are finally, after only a year, catching on to the many unnecessary problems created by US oil and gas export restrictions. Hopefully, they’ll keep at it (even if they continue to ignore me).
Second, and maybe more obviously, these export restrictions – dating back, in the case of gas, to the 1930s! – are causing serious, serious problems for the United States: distorting energy markets, eliminating jobs, depressing economic growth, creating global trade frictions and undermining other, worthwhile US government policies. They reflect a bygone era of US energy homogeneity and scarcity.
Isn’t it time that our laws – and our political leaders – caught up?
Labels:
Cato,
Energy,
Exports,
MSM,
Self-promotion,
Trade Policy,
WTO
Thursday, June 27, 2013
The Coming Crude Calamity (Due Solely to Government)
Today Reuters published a new oped of mine on crude oil export restrictions. The whole thing is (obviously) worth your time, but here's a taste:
So given the glacial pace of natural gas export license approvals (under a much more permissive legal system, by the way), the general proclivities of the current occupant of the White House, and the complete dysfunction of our beloved Congress what do you think's gonna happen here?
Yeah, I'm not holding my breath either.
The American “shale boom” is poised to revolutionize global energy markets. It could transform the nation from a longtime net oil importer into an export powerhouse. Consider that the 2012 increase in U.S. crude oil production, announced last week, was the largest not just in U.S. history but the world.Like I said, be sure to read the whole thing, but before you click over to Reuters, let me pick up on some of the points above for a second. The Wall Street Journal just this week wrote a fantastic piece explaining the impending calamity facing US oil and gas producers - and the US energy market more broadly - if we don't reform the current ban on crude exports (emphasis mine):
To help this transformation, a bipartisan swath of federal and state officials is pressing for new infrastructure, like the Keystone XL pipeline, to move a glut of domestic oil from the center of North America to Gulf ports. This is a crucial step, but unless Congress reforms archaic restrictions on crude oil exports, all that black gold’s going nowhere....
[B]y curtailing exports and subjecting license approvals to the whims of bureaucrats, the current system slows domestic production, breeds economic distortions, discourages investment and destabilizes energy markets.
U.S. oil producers, for example, lose an estimated $10 billion a year due to their inability to sell crude in foreign markets. They’ve also spent hundreds of millions of dollars building “mini-refineries” in the Midwest and Gulf region to circumvent the current restrictions and export a slightly processed, cheaper product — leaving another $1.7 billion in potential profit on the table.
As Rube-Goldbergian as this sounds, producers have few alternatives, given that U.S. oil consumption has collapsed in recent years and building new refinery capacity is virtually impossible in many “environmentally friendly” states. These problems prompted the head of the International Energy Agency to warn recently that U.S. export restrictions put the “American oil boom” at risk.
New pipelines are beginning to carry a glut of domestic crude from the middle of the country to Texas' Gulf Coast, boosting the fortunes of the area's big refineries and further fueling a decline in oil imports.In short, we're producing tons of oil (and related jobs) and have the seemingly-infinite potential to produce even more. New pipelines will be able move this oil from places like North Dakota, Oklahoma and Texas to Gulf-state and other refineries, but for various reasons we simply won't have the domestic refining capacity to handle all of it. When we hit the point at which production officially outstrips refinery capacity, we'll have only two choices: lift the current, decades-old export ban or leave the excess oil in the ground (and sacrifice the jobs and growth associated with such activity).
Magellan Midstream Partners' Longhorn pipeline began shipping oil from West Texas to Houston in April—the first of at least seven pipeline projects that could send as much as two million barrels a day from oil-saturated choke points in Oklahoma and the interior of Texas to the largest concentration of refineries in the country. But domestic oil production is at such a high level that the Gulf Coast refineries won't be able to process all of the crude....
Refiners on the Texas Gulf Coast, which process about a quarter of U.S. gasoline, are poised to be the beneficiaries of the new pipelines. They have been largely stuck paying for more-expensive imported crude, or paying extra transport costs to have the cheaper, stranded U.S. crude brought in on rail cars, which are generally more costly than pipelines. Valero Energy Corp., Phillips 66 and Marathon Petroleum Corp., as well as Exxon Mobil Corp., which runs a major refinery in Baytown, Texas, all stand to gain....
However, Texas refiners won't be able to take full advantage of the influx of U.S. oil, most of which is of the variety known as light sweet. That is because many of those refineries were modified years ago to also deal with heavier crudes from Mexico, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, preventing significant portions of their plants from refining light crude.
"It's rare to find a refinery down there that can take the majority of its crude" from the U.S. supply of light, sweet oil, said Cowen Securities analyst Sam Margolin.
Some industry experts think the pipelines will simply ease the oil glut in Cushing and create one in the Houston area as U.S. crude pours into the area faster than refiners can process it.
Trying to sell the crude abroad instead won't provide refiners a relief valve: U.S. law prohibits most crude exports, although refined products can be shipped overseas.
So given the glacial pace of natural gas export license approvals (under a much more permissive legal system, by the way), the general proclivities of the current occupant of the White House, and the complete dysfunction of our beloved Congress what do you think's gonna happen here?
Yeah, I'm not holding my breath either.
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Wednesday, May 22, 2013
Welcome to the Whimsy-conomy, Energy Trade Edition
This entry was cross-posted on the Cato Institute's blog, Cato at Liberty.
The AP reports some bad news for anyone seeking a little security and predictability in the US and global energy markets:
And who says the U.S. government isn’t swift and efficient?
Government sloth aside, these two recent announcements raise a host of serious concerns. As I explained in a recent blog post summarizing my Cato Institute paper on crude oil and natural gas exports, the immediate approval of all natural gas export license applications, as well as broader reform of the system itself, is an economic and political no-brainer. This is because the current licensing systems—and the de facto export restrictions that they create—raise a raft of economic, legal and political problems. For example, the discretionary restrictions on exportation—reinforced by the last week’s developments—likely violate the United States’ WTO obligations and directly contradict longstanding U.S. government support for American exports and opposition to other countries’ export restrictions.
Moreover, and contrary to Moniz’s assertions, the evidence of the economic benefits of fossil fuel exports isn’t isolated to a single DOE study, but has been repeatedly and thoroughly established by government, think tanks, and industry and consumer groups. For these reasons, there is wide, bipartisan support in Congress and the U.S. business community for immediately approving all pending natural gas export applications. The only groups that oppose these exports are the strange bedfellows of misguided environmentalists (who fear that additional exports will lead to increased fracking) and self-interested, gas-consuming industries (who want that cheap gas all to themselves, regardless of the broader economic or trade policy harms).
More broadly, these recent developments demonstrate the government-created uncertainty plaguing not only American energy producers, investors, and workers, but many other of their fellow Americans. As I noted in February:
Unfortunately, this type of uncertainty pervades U.S. trade and economic policy. Whether it’s bailing out Detroit and the UAW at the expense of certain private investors, or heavily subsidizing green energy through supposedly temporary tax breaks, or negotiating restrictions on Japanese auto imports as Japan’s “entry fee” into the Trans-Pacific Trade Negotiations, or implementing last-minute tax hikes or spending increases, the U.S. government seems intent on substituting the whims of politicians and bureaucrats for predictable, constitutional, free market fiscal policy. As a result, our American “whimsy-conomy” sputters along.
It would be crazy to think that U.S. policymakers can eliminate this rampant uncertainty overnight, but they could at least begin the process by reforming our archaic and problematic energy export laws to freely permit the exportation of all energy products, regardless of type or origin. Such a policy change would help the economy, bring U.S. policy into compliance with our trade commitments, have strong political support, and take America’s energy future out of the hands of unelected bureaucrats like Secretary Moniz.
If they can’t undertake these simple and obviously necessary reforms, the rest of the whimsy-conomy doesn’t stand a fighting chance.
The AP reports some bad news for anyone seeking a little security and predictability in the US and global energy markets:
Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz said Tuesday he will delay final decisions on about 20 applications to export liquefied natural gas until he reviews studies by the Energy Department and others on what impact the exports would have on domestic natural gas supplies and prices.
Moniz, who was sworn in Tuesday as the nation’s new energy chief, said he promised during his confirmation hearing that he would “review what’s out there” before acting on proposals to export natural gas. Among the things Moniz said he wants to review is whether the data in the studies are outdated.
A study commissioned by the Energy Department concluded last year that exporting natural gas would benefit the U.S. economy even if it led to higher domestic prices for the fuel.The AP adds that Secretary Moniz justified this delay as his “commitment” to Senate Energy Committee Chairman Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) who opposes natural gas exports and has criticized the DOE study. Moniz’s statement comes just days after his department (quietly, on a Friday) approved one pending export application—moving the grand total of approvals to two out of 20 total applications, most of which have been sitting on DOE’s desk for several years now.
And who says the U.S. government isn’t swift and efficient?
Government sloth aside, these two recent announcements raise a host of serious concerns. As I explained in a recent blog post summarizing my Cato Institute paper on crude oil and natural gas exports, the immediate approval of all natural gas export license applications, as well as broader reform of the system itself, is an economic and political no-brainer. This is because the current licensing systems—and the de facto export restrictions that they create—raise a raft of economic, legal and political problems. For example, the discretionary restrictions on exportation—reinforced by the last week’s developments—likely violate the United States’ WTO obligations and directly contradict longstanding U.S. government support for American exports and opposition to other countries’ export restrictions.
Moreover, and contrary to Moniz’s assertions, the evidence of the economic benefits of fossil fuel exports isn’t isolated to a single DOE study, but has been repeatedly and thoroughly established by government, think tanks, and industry and consumer groups. For these reasons, there is wide, bipartisan support in Congress and the U.S. business community for immediately approving all pending natural gas export applications. The only groups that oppose these exports are the strange bedfellows of misguided environmentalists (who fear that additional exports will lead to increased fracking) and self-interested, gas-consuming industries (who want that cheap gas all to themselves, regardless of the broader economic or trade policy harms).
More broadly, these recent developments demonstrate the government-created uncertainty plaguing not only American energy producers, investors, and workers, but many other of their fellow Americans. As I noted in February:
By depressing domestic prices and subjecting export approval to the whims of government bureaucrats, the U.S. licensing systems retard domestic energy production, discourage investment in the oil and gas sectors, and destabilize the domestic energy market. Artificially low prices prevent producers from achieving a sustainable rate of return on the massive up-front costs required to drill and extract oil and gas, and investors lack any assurances under the discretionary licensing systems that domestic prices will not collapse when output increases. Such concerns have led the IEA to recently warn that U.S. export restrictions put the “American oil boom” at risk.In short, current uncertainty retards highly capital-intensive domestic energy investment, production, and hiring, thereby destabilizing the market and curtailing economic growth. And what better example of such uncertainty is the surprise approval of one gas export application quickly followed by a single bureaucrat’s announcement that—in order to keep a “commitment” to a single U.S. Senator—no others will be approved until he personally is satisfied with widely-supported data that have been before his agency for months?
Unfortunately, this type of uncertainty pervades U.S. trade and economic policy. Whether it’s bailing out Detroit and the UAW at the expense of certain private investors, or heavily subsidizing green energy through supposedly temporary tax breaks, or negotiating restrictions on Japanese auto imports as Japan’s “entry fee” into the Trans-Pacific Trade Negotiations, or implementing last-minute tax hikes or spending increases, the U.S. government seems intent on substituting the whims of politicians and bureaucrats for predictable, constitutional, free market fiscal policy. As a result, our American “whimsy-conomy” sputters along.
It would be crazy to think that U.S. policymakers can eliminate this rampant uncertainty overnight, but they could at least begin the process by reforming our archaic and problematic energy export laws to freely permit the exportation of all energy products, regardless of type or origin. Such a policy change would help the economy, bring U.S. policy into compliance with our trade commitments, have strong political support, and take America’s energy future out of the hands of unelected bureaucrats like Secretary Moniz.
If they can’t undertake these simple and obviously necessary reforms, the rest of the whimsy-conomy doesn’t stand a fighting chance.
Labels:
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Monday, March 25, 2013
Smart Power
One of the things not covered in my Cato Institute paper on US natural gas and crude oil exports was the potential geopolitical implications of the US fossil fuel boom. This omission was due mainly to size constraints and the fact that the paper was intended to focus on the economic and trade issues raised by the United States' restrictive export licensing systems for gas and oil. That doesn't mean, however, that these systems - and the de facto bans on US gas/oil exports that they effectuate - don't raise important foreign policy concerns, as noted in this recent article from US News and World Report:
And it's for this reason that the following stories from the last week have me scratching my head (if not banging it against my desk):
[I]f the U.S. is allowed to export to Europe... countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Greece gain access to alternate, more stable sources of natural gas, loosening Russia's vice grip on the European natural gas supply. Incidentally, the U.S. has already played a role shifting the relationship between energy suppliers and importers in Europe.... The shale gas revolution, which has dramatically increased domestic supplies of natural gas in the United States has all but eliminated the need for imports. That, in turn, has rerouted supplies originally headed for U.S. ports to Europe, helping to ease price pressures there.Many other people from a wide range of political and policy perspectives have echoed these conclusions: scrapping our archaic oil and gas export restrictions and thereby permitting such exports to Europe and Asia is a geopolitical no-brainer for the United States, especially in this new "sequestration" era of tight federal budgets and reduced US spending on more traditional forms of national defense.
U.S. exports of natural gas could also play a role in increasing the bite of sanctions levied on Iran over its nuclear program. Turkey currently depends on Iran for 20 percent of its natural gas imports. But as with Europe, if new sources of gas imports are made available, Turkey could reduce its reliance on Iran. That would, in turn, cut into the revenues reaped by the Iranian regime.
In Asia, exporting natural gas to energy hungry allies such as Japan and South Korea could help solidify diplomatic relations. In the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, Japan—already the top importer of natural gas—has shut down nearly all of its reactors, making the country much more dependent on fossil fuels such as oil, coal, and natural gas. With high natural gas prices in Asia, Japan is looking for anything cheaper. At rock bottom prices at home, U.S. suppliers can beat the international prices and make a good profit even with expensive liquefaction and shipment....
And it's for this reason that the following stories from the last week have me scratching my head (if not banging it against my desk):
- UK's Telegraph: "With the worst snow conditions in the country since 1981, it’s worrying, to say the least, that gas supplies are running low.... Because of a misguided faith in green energy, we have left ourselves far too dependent on foreign gas supplies, largely provided by Russian and Middle Eastern producers. Only 45 per cent of our gas consumption comes from domestic sources. All it takes is a spell of bad weather, and the closure of a gas pipeline from Belgium, to leave us dangerously exposed, and to send gas prices soaring. Talk of rationing may be exaggerated, but our energy policy is failing to deal with Britain’s fundamental incapacity to produce our own power."
- Bloomberg: "China agreed to double oil supplies and supported construction of a natural gas pipeline from Russia under 'breakthrough' agreements during President Xi Jinping’s first state trip abroad. OAO Rosneft, the world’s biggest traded oil producer by output, will borrow $2 billion from China Development Bank Corp., backed by 25 years of oil supplies, under accords signed yesterday in the Kremlin. The Russian company also offered China National Petroleum Corp. access to Arctic resources, and OAO Gazprom said it plans to conclude a 30-year gas-supply contract to China by year-end."
To recap: as the Obama administration continues to stall pending natural gas export license applications and has (apparently) no intention of reforming our current, problematic systems for gas or oil, US allies in Europe and Asia are desperate for access to cheap, stable energy supplies, and China's insatiable appetite for oil and gas has just pushed them ever-closer to Moscow.
So much for that "smart power," eh?
UPDATE: Mark Perry has more on the UK's major energy mess. If only they had a friend who could help.
UPDATE: Mark Perry has more on the UK's major energy mess. If only they had a friend who could help.
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Thursday, February 28, 2013
New Podcast re: License to Drill
The good folks at Coffee & Markets had me back on today to discuss my new Cato Institute paper on natural gas and crude oil export restrictions. The podcast is available for listening or downloading here. Enjoy!
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Wednesday, February 27, 2013
Speaking of Distortions...
In my new Cato paper, I discuss the distortions and economic loss caused by current US export restrictions on natural gas and crude oil - one of the big reasons why fundamental reform of our export licensing systems is desperately needed. Most of the current policy debate has focused on the natural gas market, but the economic distortions are just as prevalent for crude oil. Case in point: this new Bloomberg article (emphasis mine):
That seems... inefficient.
So isn't it time we established some rhyme and reason to the system?
A glut of shale oil in fields from Texas to North Dakota is forcing producers to find ways around the U.S.’s three-decade-old ban on crude exports in order to seek higher prices in foreign markets.So because of US crude oil export restrictions, domestic oil producers are spending billions of dollars to construct mini-refineries that produce a slightly-refined product that may be freely exported but sells at a discount to crude on the international market. Meanwhile, simply getting the US government out of the way and permitting unlimited crude oil exports would generate $40 billion per year for US energy producers and their workers.
Kinder Morgan Energy Partners LP (KMP) is among companies setting up mini-refineries to process certain grades of crude just enough to qualify them as refined fuels, which are legal to export.
The industry’s best hope is ultra-light oil, which is so abundant in shale rock that it has flooded the Gulf Coast and traded for a record discount to global benchmark Brent crude last quarter. Potential revenue for exports is $40 billion a year based on global prices, or about $9.7 billion more than what the same oil fetches in the U.S....
Because there are not enough buyers where it’s pumped, the easy-to-refine crude has become the vanguard of an effort by the oil industry to get Congress to further weaken U.S. limits on most crude oil and natural gas exports that have been in place since the early 20th century....
Valero Energy Corp. (VLO), Kinder Morgan and Marathon Petroleum Corp. (MPC) are spending $850 million to build mini-refineries or upgrade existing plants to process the ultra-light crude. The soonest to come online is Kinder’s, set for the first quarter of 2014.
The plants will do little more than heat oil and condensate to a boiling point and distill them into separate fluids. Prices for condensate average about $4.57 less per barrel than heavier U.S. crude, crimping producer profits by as much as $1.7 billion a year, according to calculations based on RBN Energy data....
The units, called splitters, may be able to process as much as 300,000 barrels of crude a day, Luaces said. The mini- refineries being built “split” the condensate into naphtha, a feedstock for making plastic and other chemicals, and kerosene, which can be exported to markets in Asia and Latin America, he said.
Those chemically simpler products may not fetch as much as finished gasoline or diesel fuel, but the lower cost of running the splitter makes it attractive to sell them on international markets, said Judith Dwarkin, chief economist at ITG Investment Research Inc. in Calgary.
“It’s a cheap way around the export limitation,” Dwarkin said in an interview.
There are no limits on refined products. U.S. fuel exports reached an all-time high last year of an average 2.6 million barrels a day, according to Energy Department data. U.S. fuel imports from OPEC have fallen 37 percent, and the country’s petroleum deficit, the difference between the cost of its hydrocarbon imports and exports, fell to $18.7 billion, the lowest since 2004, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
“Some molecules are painted with a no export sign,” said Braziel, of RBN. “Other molecules are painted with the OK to export sign, and there doesn’t seem to be any rhyme or reason as to why some molecules are OK and some aren’t.”
That seems... inefficient.
So isn't it time we established some rhyme and reason to the system?
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Monday, February 25, 2013
Permitting Oil and Gas Exports Is a No-Brainer
The following entry was cross-posted at the Cato Institute's blog, Cato at Liberty:
Following today’s deadline for interested party comments, the U.S. Department of Energy will begin to consider sixteen pending applications to export natural gas to countries like Japan with whom the United States does not have a free trade agreement. The issue is a contentious one: energy producers, many other U.S. companies and a large, bipartisan swath of Congress have urged DOE to approve all export license applications, but opposition has materialized among certain domestic consuming industries and environmental groups. As a result, the Obama administration has delayed consideration of all but one application, and is expected to eventually permit a portion of the remaining exports in an attempt to placate both sides of the debate.
As I explain in a new Cato Institute paper, however, such a Solomonic decision might achieve the administration’s political objectives but will do nothing to fix the fundamental problems raised by U.S. export regulations for natural gas or similar rules for crude oil. These exports continue to be governed by licensing systems adopted when the United States was a net energy importer and dependent on fossil fuels for energy production – a picture far different from the production, price, and trade realities that exist today due to revolutionary fossil fuel extraction technologies like hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) and horizontal drilling. In fact, domestic production of crude oil and natural gas has skyrocketed in recent years, driving down prices, boosting downstream industries, creating ample export opportunities and potentially reversing the United States’ historic position as a net energy importer. However, our gas and oil export licensing systems – respectively governed by the Natural Gas Act of 1937 and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 – continue to treat fossil fuel exports as a rarity and subject them to a long, opaque approval process under which the federal government retains ample discretion to approve or deny most export license applications.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these outdated systems, and the restrictions they impose on U.S. exports, create a host of problems:
Following today’s deadline for interested party comments, the U.S. Department of Energy will begin to consider sixteen pending applications to export natural gas to countries like Japan with whom the United States does not have a free trade agreement. The issue is a contentious one: energy producers, many other U.S. companies and a large, bipartisan swath of Congress have urged DOE to approve all export license applications, but opposition has materialized among certain domestic consuming industries and environmental groups. As a result, the Obama administration has delayed consideration of all but one application, and is expected to eventually permit a portion of the remaining exports in an attempt to placate both sides of the debate.
As I explain in a new Cato Institute paper, however, such a Solomonic decision might achieve the administration’s political objectives but will do nothing to fix the fundamental problems raised by U.S. export regulations for natural gas or similar rules for crude oil. These exports continue to be governed by licensing systems adopted when the United States was a net energy importer and dependent on fossil fuels for energy production – a picture far different from the production, price, and trade realities that exist today due to revolutionary fossil fuel extraction technologies like hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) and horizontal drilling. In fact, domestic production of crude oil and natural gas has skyrocketed in recent years, driving down prices, boosting downstream industries, creating ample export opportunities and potentially reversing the United States’ historic position as a net energy importer. However, our gas and oil export licensing systems – respectively governed by the Natural Gas Act of 1937 and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 – continue to treat fossil fuel exports as a rarity and subject them to a long, opaque approval process under which the federal government retains ample discretion to approve or deny most export license applications.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these outdated systems, and the restrictions they impose on U.S. exports, create a host of problems:
- First, by depressing domestic prices and subjecting export approval to the whims of government bureaucrats, the U.S. licensing systems retard domestic energy production, discourage investment in the oil and gas sectors, and destabilize the domestic energy market. Artificially low prices prevent producers from achieving a sustainable rate of return on the massive up-front costs required to drill and extract oil and gas, and investors lack any assurances under the discretionary licensing systems that domestic prices will not collapse when output increases. Such concerns have led the IEA to recently warn that U.S. export restrictions put the “American oil boom” at risk. And contrary to certain politicians’ claims, independent reports show that the exportation of oil and gas would not cause a traumatic spike in prices, thus enabling consumers to continue to benefit from hypercompetitive U.S. fuel and feedstock supplies.
- Second, restricting U.S. gas and oil exports could hurt the U.S. economy. Recent studies indicate that these exports - even in unlimited quantities - would not only benefit U.S. energy producers, but also increase real household income.
- Third, both export licensing systems raise serious concerns under global trade rules. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) prohibits WTO Members from imposing export restrictions implemented via slow or discretionary licensing systems like those at issue here. Moreover, several nations, including the United States, impose anti-subsidy measures (called “countervailing duties” or “CVDs”) on downstream exports (e.g., steel) due to export restrictions on their upstream inputs (e.g., iron). Thus, the crude oil and natural gas licensing systems could lead to anti-subsidy duties on energy-intensive U.S. exports that negate the very price advantages created by the licensing systems – a heightened risk, given that American exporters are increasingly targeted by foreign CVD actions.
- Fourth, current policy contradicts several other Obama administration priorities. Most obviously, restricting oil and gas exports undermines the president’s National Export Initiative and stands in stark contrast to his full-throated advocacy of other energy exports, particularly renewables like biofuels and solar panels. Moreover, the use of export restrictions to benefit downstream industries contradicts longstanding U.S. policy of using countervailing duties to discourage foreign imports that unfairly benefit from export restrictions on upstream inputs. Finally, the U.S. government has long opposed restrictive and opaque export licensing systems in WTO negotiations and dispute settlement. The current U.S. export licensing regulations for oil and gas contradict these positions and undermine multilateral efforts to rein in such restrictions.
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Thursday, February 21, 2013
License to Drill: The Case for Modernizing America’s Crude Oil and Natural Gas Export Licensing Systems
That's the pun-tastic name of my new briefer for the Cato Institute. Here's introduction:
Revolutionary extraction technologies have helped increase the supply of fossil fuels in the United States, driving down prices, spurring economic activity, and potentially reversing the longtime status of the United States as a net energy importer to a significant exporter. Impeding that transition are outdated federal regulations—in particular discretionary export licensing systems for natural gas and crude oil—that restrict exports, distort domestic energy prices, deter investment, and encourage graft. They also subvert some of the Obama administration stated policy objectives and could run afoul of U.S. international trade obligations.The full paper is available on Cato's website here. Probably my favorite part is the section on the inconsistency between the Obama administration's use - intentional or otherwise - of archaic licensing systems to restrict oil and gas exports and various other White House policies:
Despite the potential economic windfall, opposition to exporting natural gas and crude oil has materialized among certain domestic consuming industries and environmental groups, causing the administration to delay any approvals on pending export-license applications. But there are compelling reasons to approve those applications and to overhaul our disjointed, anachronistic, export license systems to properly reflect the new energy landscape. This paper describes those reasons and provides a basic roadmap for reform.
First, the restrictive export licensing systems undermine the National Export Initiative (NEI) and its goal of doubling U.S. exports between 2009 and 2014. Second, the administration’s reticence with respect to fossil fuel exports stands in stark contrast to its full-throated advocacy of other energy exports, particularly renewables like bio fuels and solar panels. Indeed, the September 2010 White House report setting forth the NEI’s priority recommendations calls for increased government support for renewable and nuclear energy exports—but never mentions oil or natural gas. A November 2012 follow-up report lauds the U.S. government’s efforts to achieve these objectives, yet continues to ignore American fossil fuels, despite the massive increases in production and export potential that occurred between 2010 and 2012. Furthermore, increased fossil-fuel exports could actually spur domestic production of renewable energy through higher oil and gas prices. According to the EIA, the role of renewables in electricity generation would be “greater in a higher-gas-price environment.”Be sure to read the whole thing. And I'd be remiss not to note some of the other recent work on this topic:
Third, the use of export restrictions to benefit downstream industries contradicts longstanding U.S. policy with respect to export restraints and illegal subsidies. The Commerce Department repeatedly has imposed anti-subsidy duties on imports to countervail subsidies resulting from foreign export restrictions on upstream inputs. The administration’s embrace of similar restrictions would not only be hypocritical, but would also expose U.S. exports of energy-intensive products (e.g., fertilizer) to “copycat” duties in key foreign markets.
Fourth, the U.S. government has long opposed restrictive and opaque export licensing systems in WTO negotiations and dispute settlement. For example, in China—Raw Materials (DS394), the U.S. government challenged China’s “non-automatic” export licensing systems for various raw materials as impermissible restrictions on exportation in violation of GATT Article XI. In March 2009, the United States and several other countries submitted a proposal to the WTO Negotiating Group on Market Access calling for increased disciplines on Members’ use of export licensing. The current U.S. export licensing regulations for oil and gas contradict these positions and undermine laudable efforts to rein in such restrictions globally.
- Heritage's Nicolas Loris on the economic benefits of natural gas exports and empowering states to control their own energy policy.
- The Peterson Institute's comments urging DOE approval of pending natural gas export license applications.
Enjoy!
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Wednesday, September 26, 2012
Behold, the Obama Administration's NatGas Politics (and Export Hypocrisy)
Today, Heritage's Ryan Olson picks up on a pretty important trade story that I missed last week: the Obama administration appears to be blocking U.S. exports of natural gas for political reasons:
evil dangerous, and thus their opposition to LNG exportation also frequently cites fracking's dangers as grounds to deny export license applications (see, e.g., this Sierra Club brief in opposition to an application from Sabine Pass LNG). Olson goes on to explain how the administration's stonewalling on these LNG export license applications could seriously harm the US natgas industry (and tons of good-paying American jobs), but, considering environmentalists views on fracking and fossil fuels more generally, that might just be what they had in mind, eh?
But I digress. For the moment, I'll try to ignore the obvious economic harms imposed by the administration's political stonewalling and instead look at two pretty ridiculous trade angles in this story. First, as Olson notes, it's rather amazing that a President whose top trade priority is the National Export Initiative is, you know, actively blocking billions of dollars in potential U.S. energy exports:
Second, and speaking of mixed messages, it turns out that the Obama administration has been fighting against these exact kinds of export restrictions at the WTO. Before I get to that glaring hypocrisy, however, a very quick summary of the US system and the applicable WTO rules is necessary. The US export licensing system for natural gas (15 U.S.C. § 717b) provides DOE with unfettered discretion to deny an application to export natural gas to non-FTA partner countries if the agency determines that the exportation would not be in the "public interest." GATT Article XI prohibits WTO Members from imposing quantitative restrictions on exports (and imports), including those made effective through export licenses. Although WTO jurisprudence on licensing restrictions remains a little unsettled, one thing is pretty clear: discretionary licensing regimes are impermissible restrictions under GATT Article XI. So, because the US licensing system provides DOE with discretion to reject any license application based on the vague “public interest” standard (as evidenced by the long delays in the aforementioned LNG applications), it could be WTO-inconsistent.
So why does this little academic lesson matter? Well, over the last couple years USTR has filed two WTO disputes against China (of course) for its export restrictions on various raw materials (DS394) and so-called "rare earth" elements (DS431). The US won (mostly) the raw materials case citing, among other things, GATT Article XI, and the new, high-profile rare earths dispute is just cranking up. In each dispute, one of the primary export restrictions targeted by the United States has been - wait for it - export licensing systems for the covered products.
So, to recap, the Obama administration is attacking Chinese export licensing restrictions on key raw materials at the exact same time that it is restricting US exports of natural gas via a similarly dubious export licensing system.
You cannot make this stuff up.
On the bright side, at least China isn't, you know, really starving for energy or known to retaliate against US trade litigation with cases of its own or anything.
Oh, wait.
Currently, liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports are restricted to countries with free trade agreements with the United States. Producers wishing to export to countries without U.S. free trade agreements must first get approval from the Department of Energy (DOE). With proven reserves of natural gas in the U.S. at an all-time high, companies have been flocking to export LNG to foreign markets. However, the DOE is stonewalling, approving only one of the 13 requests to export to non-free trade agreement countries and staking further exports on the release of a report that has been delayed until early next year. These types of bureaucratic hoops only hurt American companies and bring into question the President’s commitment to increasing exports.The Reuters article that Olson cites helpfully explains that the big report was originally going to be out in March, then got delayed until late summer, and now won't be out until after the November elections. That, of course, is quite convenient for the Obama administration, as Olson explains:
The Administration appears to be listening to economic advice from interest groups (including environmental groups) who oppose natural gas exports. They argue that free trade in the LNG field will disadvantage U.S. consumers, claiming that as the spread between the international price and the domestic price closes, U.S. prices will rise.I'd add that many of these environmental groups also argue that the process by which much of natural gas is extracted these days - hydraulic fracturing or "fracking" - is
But I digress. For the moment, I'll try to ignore the obvious economic harms imposed by the administration's political stonewalling and instead look at two pretty ridiculous trade angles in this story. First, as Olson notes, it's rather amazing that a President whose top trade priority is the National Export Initiative is, you know, actively blocking billions of dollars in potential U.S. energy exports:
The President has said he wants to “double our exports over the next five years” through his National Export Initiative. Apparently, those exports don’t include natural gas, a booming and vibrant sector of the national economy....Indeed it does, Mr. Olson. Indeed it does.
Recent studies have shown that exporting natural gas could make U.S. producers up to $3 billion per year, creating much-needed jobs for Americans. Reducing burdensome trade restrictions will also make U.S. firms more efficient, encouraging competition and reducing prices—ultimately helping consumers and spurring innovation. The President’s erratic policy of promoting trade in some areas while restricting it in others is hypocritical. Even worse, it sends mixed messages that increase uncertainty, hurt investment and job growth, and threaten American’s economic competitiveness.
Second, and speaking of mixed messages, it turns out that the Obama administration has been fighting against these exact kinds of export restrictions at the WTO. Before I get to that glaring hypocrisy, however, a very quick summary of the US system and the applicable WTO rules is necessary. The US export licensing system for natural gas (15 U.S.C. § 717b) provides DOE with unfettered discretion to deny an application to export natural gas to non-FTA partner countries if the agency determines that the exportation would not be in the "public interest." GATT Article XI prohibits WTO Members from imposing quantitative restrictions on exports (and imports), including those made effective through export licenses. Although WTO jurisprudence on licensing restrictions remains a little unsettled, one thing is pretty clear: discretionary licensing regimes are impermissible restrictions under GATT Article XI. So, because the US licensing system provides DOE with discretion to reject any license application based on the vague “public interest” standard (as evidenced by the long delays in the aforementioned LNG applications), it could be WTO-inconsistent.
So why does this little academic lesson matter? Well, over the last couple years USTR has filed two WTO disputes against China (of course) for its export restrictions on various raw materials (DS394) and so-called "rare earth" elements (DS431). The US won (mostly) the raw materials case citing, among other things, GATT Article XI, and the new, high-profile rare earths dispute is just cranking up. In each dispute, one of the primary export restrictions targeted by the United States has been - wait for it - export licensing systems for the covered products.
So, to recap, the Obama administration is attacking Chinese export licensing restrictions on key raw materials at the exact same time that it is restricting US exports of natural gas via a similarly dubious export licensing system.
You cannot make this stuff up.
On the bright side, at least China isn't, you know, really starving for energy or known to retaliate against US trade litigation with cases of its own or anything.
Oh, wait.
Labels:
Energy,
Exports,
Green Technology,
Hypocrisy,
Trade Policy,
USTR,
WTO
Wednesday, June 27, 2012
No Joke: US Export Promotion Effort Funded by... Taxing Exports
The Office of Senator Jim DeMint has done some worthwhile digging into the Obama administration's new US tourism promotion effort, "Brand USA," and what they've uncovered is actually more ridiculous than you'd expect. The report's goal is to show that the new export promotion program - remember: domestic tourism is actually an "export" because foreign dollars are spent here on US goods and services - is rife with cronyism, over-spending and general mismanagement. (The lede: "High-powered executives are enjoying luxury accommodations all over the world, all in the name of promoting tourism for the U.S. government." Yikes.)
Now, this news is certainly not good for US taxpayers, but let's face it: this type of stuff is unfortunately pretty commonplace in government and we're not talking about a lot of money here. On the other hand, it's this seemingly-innocuous passage that caught my attention:
Seriously.
Now, I'm no mercantilist, but even I can see that if you want to encourage exports it's probably not a good idea to - you know - tax them. (Then again, this is the same US government that imposed new taxes on imports in order to fund trade-liberalizing free trade agreements, so maybe they're just being consistent.)
This export promotion law becomes an even worse idea when we learn, as Senator DeMint's office helpfully informs us, that a good portion of these export taxes aren't even funding tourism exports but instead are helping, among other things, "CEOs from some of the nation’s most successful hotels and resorts... to book top-of-the-line venues to entertain other members of the travel industry."
So, really, we have an export tax that's bizarrely intended to promote exports but really just promotes the lavish expenditures of certain big exporters and, of course, the generous and helpful bureaucrats facilitating those expenditures.
You simply cannot make this stuff up.
(h/t Ben Domenech)
Now, this news is certainly not good for US taxpayers, but let's face it: this type of stuff is unfortunately pretty commonplace in government and we're not talking about a lot of money here. On the other hand, it's this seemingly-innocuous passage that caught my attention:
Established through the 2010 Travel Promotion Act, Brand USA is eligible to receive up to $100 million annually generated through new taxes paid by foreign travelers.I freely admit that prior to today I had only a vague recollection that this Act - passed during the halcyon days of total Democrat control of the White House and Congress - even existed. A little Googling reveals a snazzy Brand USA website and the text of the Travel Promotion Act, which was included as Section 9 in another bill reauthorizing the Capitol Police (no joke) and provides in subsection (d) for the establishment of a "Travel Promotion Fund" and then in subsection (e) for a "Travel Promotion Fund Fee." The good folks at Global Trade Alert have summarized that fee as follows:
The law institutes a new fee of $10 or more on visitors traveling to the United States from the 35 countries that participate in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) . This new tax is supposed to raise an estimated $200 million per year, which will be used to help fund a new “Corporation for Travel Promotion.” The purpose of this new corporation is to promote tourism to the United States.I'm certainly not going to get into the trade law weeds regarding the WTO-consistency of the Travel Promotion Fund Fees (although that is an interesting issue). Instead, I just want to clarify that this is an actual US law that is designed to promote tourism exports by imposing a new tax on - and thus discouraging - tourism exports.
The bill developed from the “Travel Promotion Act of 2009” (S.1023 as originally introduced...), a bill that would establish a program for the promotion of travel to the United States, and provide for two separate means of funding this program. One would be a fee of at least $10 on each traveler from certain countries that enter the United States, and the other an unspecified set of assessments on the travel industry in the United States. These fees might be inconsistent with the national-treatment principle of GATT Article III and (perhaps more appropriately) GATS Article XVII.
Seriously.
Now, I'm no mercantilist, but even I can see that if you want to encourage exports it's probably not a good idea to - you know - tax them. (Then again, this is the same US government that imposed new taxes on imports in order to fund trade-liberalizing free trade agreements, so maybe they're just being consistent.)
This export promotion law becomes an even worse idea when we learn, as Senator DeMint's office helpfully informs us, that a good portion of these export taxes aren't even funding tourism exports but instead are helping, among other things, "CEOs from some of the nation’s most successful hotels and resorts... to book top-of-the-line venues to entertain other members of the travel industry."
So, really, we have an export tax that's bizarrely intended to promote exports but really just promotes the lavish expenditures of certain big exporters and, of course, the generous and helpful bureaucrats facilitating those expenditures.
You simply cannot make this stuff up.
(h/t Ben Domenech)
Labels:
Cronyism,
Exports,
Fail,
Jim DeMint,
Mercantilism,
Subsidies,
Taxes,
Tourism
Sunday, May 6, 2012
New McKinsey Study Pokes Fatal Holes in Common Trade Myths
Readers of this blog know that one of the themes here has been dismantling pervasive "protectionist myths" that mislead the public into supporting - and thereby empower politicians to implement - anti-trade policies. Now, a new study from McKinsey, "Trading myths: Addressing misconceptions about trade, jobs, and competitiveness," contributes to this line of attack scholarship. There are a few things here that I don't totally support (e.g., erroneously labeling an expanding trade deficit a per se "deterioration"), but the whole thing is definitely worth a read. Some of the myths addressed include the following:
Now, if only a few of our political leaders - from either party - would listen.
(h/t ToGetRichIsGlorious)
Myth: Mature economies are losing out to emerging markets in trade and thus face increasing trade deficits.
Reality: The trade balance of mature economies has remained largely stable in the aggregate and even begun to improve. There are wide variations between individual countries, but no evidence supports claims of a wholesale deterioration of the trade balance between the mature and emerging economies over the past decade.
Myth: Manufactured goods driveThe authors also hit on several other myths in the report, such as:deteriorating[SL: sorry, I couldn't resist] trade deficits.
Reality: Imports of primary resources, whose prices have been rising sharply, are the largest negative contributor to the trade balance of mature economies. In 2008, mature economies ran a 3.3 percent of GDP trade deficit in primary resources but a 0.5 percent of GDP surplus in manufactured goods and specifically a 1.6 percent surplus in knowledge-intensive manufacturing. Some individual mature countries run trade deficits in knowledge-intensive manufacturing.
Myth: Trade is at the heart of the loss of manufacturing jobs.
Reality: Changes in the composition of demand and ongoing productivity increases are the main reasons for the decline in the number of such jobs in mature economies. The share of manufacturing in these countries’ total employment is bound to decline further, from 12 percent today to less than 10 percent in 2030, according to our analysis. MGI finds that trade or offshoring are responsible for the loss of around 20 percent of the 5.8 million US manufacturing jobs eliminated between 2000 and 2010.
Myth: Mature economies create jobs only in low-paid, low‑value domestic servicesAfter dispatching all of these myths, the authors make several policy suggestions that also should sound familiar to this blog's readership:
Myth: Service trade is small, and emerging economies with low‑cost talent will capture any increase
Myth: “Service economies” such as the United States are the world leaders in service trade
- Resist protectionist pressures.
- See emerging economies as an opportunity, not a threat.
- Push vigorously for the fuller liberalization of trade in services, where restrictions remain high.
- Gear trade-related policy toward supporting—and benefiting from—comparative advantage in attractive stages of global value chains (like R&D and design), and avoid any emphasis on sustaining or creating direct employment through manufacturing exports.
- Improve measurements of global value chains and services trade.I, unsurprisingly, think that if the federal government implemented these policy solutions, US businesses and workers would be much, much better positioned to dominate the 21st century global economy. (And I've been screaming it from the rooftops for a few years now.)
Now, if only a few of our political leaders - from either party - would listen.
(h/t ToGetRichIsGlorious)
Labels:
Exports,
Free Trade,
Manufacturing,
Protectionist Myths,
Services
Tuesday, April 24, 2012
New Podcast: Russia, the United States and the WTO
The good folks at Coffee and Markets had me on their show today to talk about Russia's WTO accession, the related US congressional vote on Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR), and broader US efforts (or lack thereof) at the WTO. The podcast is available to listen or download here or here.
Enjoy!
Enjoy!
Labels:
Exports,
Russia,
Self-promotion,
Services,
Trade Policy,
WTO
Monday, April 9, 2012
"Export-Oriented America"
GMU's Tyler Cowen has a new article in the American Interest that explores a lot of the issues that I've been covering here for the last few years. Cowen first provides three reasons to think that the United States could become an export powerhouse in the next few years (hint: none of them involve China's currency or President Obama's National Export Initiative):
That interesting hypothetical aside, Cowen goes on to explain the big downside to the United States big export surge:
Nevertheless, Cowen next explains that even his overly-bad news comes with a silver lining:
Or is "the future" right now?
First, artificial intelligence and computing power are the future, or even the present, for much of manufacturing.... Factory floors these days are nearly empty of people because software-driven machines are doing most of the work....So far, so good. Cowen goes on to explain that America's new export strength "will resurrect the United States as a dominant global economic power," helping to resolve the United States budget, trade and diplomatic problems. I especially like Cowen's optimism that "[t]he opposition to free trade as it existed during the 1980s, and which led even Ronald Reagan into auto protectionism, is almost gone, and these pro-export developments mean that it won’t come back anytime soon." I wonder, however, whether this new US support for free trade could be undermined as US exports are increasingly subject to trade remedies actions in key foreign markets like China - ironic, considering that the United States has always been one of the biggest users (and defenders) of trade remedies to curb foreign imports. On the other hand, maybe it will result in a significant change in US trade remedies policies in forums like the WTO, seeking to impose, rather than rebuff, more stringent disciplines on nations' application of trade remedies measures.
The more the world relies on smart machines, the more domestic wage rates become irrelevant for export prowess. That will help the wealthier countries, most of all America. This logic works on both sides. America is using less labor in manufacturing, but China is too, even as its manufacturing output is rising. The fact that Chinese manufacturing employment is falling along with ours means that both our higher wages and their lower wages are becoming less relevant for the location of manufacturing decisions. The less manufacturing has to do with labor costs and relative wage levels, the greater the comparative advantage of the United States....
The second force behind export growth will be the recent discoveries of very large shale oil and natural gas deposits in the United States. Come 2030, the United States may well be the new Saudi Arabia of energy markets. We have new fossil fuel discoveries to draw upon, enough to fuel this country for decades, and there is plenty of foreign demand for those resources....
[T]he third reason why America is likely to return as a dominant export power: demand from the rapidly developing countries, and not just or even mainly demand for fossil fuel. As the developing world becomes wealthier, demand for American exports will grow. (Mexico, which is already geared to a U.S.-dominated global economy, is likely to be another big winner, but that is a story for another day.)
In the early stages of growth in developing nations, importers buy timber, copper, nickel and resources linked to construction and infrastructure development. Those have not been U.S. export specialties, and so a lot of the gains from these countries’ growth so far have gone to Canada, Australia and Chile. Usually American outputs are geared toward wealthier consumers and higher-quality outputs, which is what you would expect from the world’s wealthiest and most technologically advanced home market. To put it simply, the closer other nations come to our economic level, the more they will want to buy our stuff. Indeed most of those nations are growing rapidly, so we can expect their attentions to shift toward American exporters. The leading categories of American exports today—civilian aircraft, semiconductors, cars, pharmaceuticals, machinery and equipment, automobile accessories, and entertainment—are going to be in the sweet spot of growing demand in what we now call the developing world....
Just as Canada and Australia have prospered over the past ten years because their specialties matched Chinese demands, the United States is likely to be the bigger winner in the next ten years as Chinese (and other) demands mature. It’s a trend that has clearly already begun. In 2010, for instance, American exports to China rose by 32 percent, according to a 2011 report by the U.S.-China Business Council. Furthermore, American companies, with their practicality and marketing expertise, will be well positioned to convert scientific innovations from Chinese labs into new commercial products once such innovations start to arrive in large numbers.
That interesting hypothetical aside, Cowen goes on to explain the big downside to the United States big export surge:
The new export-based prosperity may not translate into higher wages for everyone, or even most people, in the United States. Skilled laborers who work with smart machines or even hold advanced managerial jobs will continue to make big gains, as the numbers have been showing for some time. Capital will do well too, especially if it is geared toward export success.... [S]ignificant segments of the American workforce are likely to continue suffering falling real wages, even in a time of rising export prowess.Although I agree (and have argued for a long while now) that US manufacturing exports are not some magic bullet for the US labor market, I'm inclined to quibble a bit with Cowen's repeated characterization of the US services sector as "cocooned within a protected domestic market." While that's certainly true for government jobs and certain health care and education jobs, it's definitely not the case for an increasing number of services jobs - for example in medicine, engineering, IT and, yes, even law (trust me) - that totally dominate in the face of real and growing global competition (precisely because US services providers are much more "creative, efficient and well managed" than their global counterparts). Cowen seems to imply later (see below) that a such a dynamic services sector is to be expected in the coming years; I'd argue that, in this respect, the future is indeed now (and it's not nearly as dystopian as Cowen makes it out to be).
As the number of American jobs in manufacturing has fallen dramatically, it is often forgotten that American manufacturing output has continued to rise, even during some slow times. In the past decade, the flow of goods coming from U.S. factories has gone up by a third as capital has increasingly become a greater share of input over labor....
[W]e’ll probably see a lot of the American workforce accept lower wages. A lot of American exporters are already experimenting with a two-tiered wage structure, with significantly lower wages for incoming workers....
To some extent, these trends resonate with the old saying, “Live by the sword, die by the sword.” Jobs in the export sector face intense competition, precisely because U.S. companies are increasingly selling into a global market, and that means wages in this sector cannot be guaranteed to rise. They might, and they might not, depending on how creative, efficient and well managed we are. Services, in contrast, are often produced inefficiently, but the jobs are more extensively cocooned within a protected domestic market, often based on government privileges and market-distorting third-party payment schemes.
Nevertheless, Cowen next explains that even his overly-bad news comes with a silver lining:
There is the prospect of a better career path, accompanying future export gains, that stands a chance of making life less grim for the working class. Some of the new technological and export-related breakthroughs will consist of making education and health care more affordable, often through software and smart machines that bypass the current credentialized control of those fields. Imagine getting an online medical diagnosis from a smart machine like IBM’s Watson, or learning mathematics from an online MITx program or one of its successors. The American poor and lower middle class will have considerably greater opportunities, at least if they are savvy with information technology and disciplined enough to take advantage of these new free or cheaper goods. Of course, this will not come close to helping everybody. These internet tools reward the self-motivated, who will be disproportionately well educated, even if their parents lack higher education, wealth and connections. Many of the rest will still fall by the wayside.Cowen concludes by predicting that the growing divide between the hyper-productive and over-protected will grow to dominate our society and our politics:
Even American earners who must cope with stagnant wages will probably reap big gains from new opportunities to lower their basic living expenses. Imagine a family earning $37,000 per year that has much cheaper education and health care costs, thanks to government benefits and internet-based innovation. No one will be tempted to call such households wealthy, but they won’t fit the standard measure of poverty either. They will have positive experiences in their lives and lots of free and nearly free goods....
The internet will continue to make it easier for small businesses to export, but many of the growth areas, including fossil fuels, heavy equipment and cars and other high-tech items will remain the province of big business. America will likely see a new age of corporate titans selling their products and services to the entire world, and the world as a whole will be far wealthier than in times past. The wealthiest American earners will be very wealthy indeed, even by current standards. Due to their export activities, they will take an increasingly global perspective, and they will give away lots of their money, just as Bill Gates has expanded his philanthropy abroad.
These days, this old portrait of the two-tiered economy, originally applicable to a developing economy, may be re-emerging for the United States. We had not thought through seriously enough the possibility that the world’s most technologically advanced economy would, over time, develop persistent and indeed growing productivity differentials across sectors. It clearly has, and the social and political frictions this has caused now dominate our politics—or soon will.A battle between the "static sector" (e.g., public sector and industrial unions) and the "dynamic sector" (e.g., industrialists, non-union workers and professional services)? Is this really, as Cowen contends, the distant future of American politics?
One way to understand this is to note a neglected implication of Moore’s Law for computer processing speed, namely that its use in the value-added process benefits some economic sectors much more than others. In this case the static sector consists of the protected services (a big chunk of health care, education and government jobs), and the dynamic sector is heavily represented in U.S. exports, often consisting of goods and services rooted in tech, connected to tech, or made much more productive by tech innovations. Piece by piece, bit by bit, we Americans are replicating the two-tiered developing economy model, albeit from a much higher base level of wealth and productivity.
Or is "the future" right now?
Labels:
Exports,
Jobs,
Labor Unions,
Manufacturing,
NEI,
Services