I, Nutella

Via Radley Balko, these pieces never get old:

Some 250,000 tons of Nutella are now sold across 75 countries around the world every year, according to the OECD. But that’s not what’s amazing about it. Nutella, it turns out, is a perfect example of what globalization has meant for popular foodstuffs: Not only is it sold everywhere, but its ingredients are sourced from all over the place too.

Even though Ferrero International, which makes the stuff, is headquartered in Italy, it has factories in Europe, Russia, North America and South America. And while certain inputs are supplied locally—like, say, the plastic for the bottles or milk—many others are shipped from all over the world. The hazelnuts are from Turkey; the palm oil is from Malaysia; the cocoa is from Nigeria; the sugar is from either Brazil or Europe; and the vanilla flavoring is from France.

The OECD mapped it all out. Have a look:

The whole OECD study is available here.

Global Supply Chains Are Freakin' Amazing

The folks at NPR's Planet Money have an excellent new series on a simple T-shirt's journey from a cotton field in Mississsippi to your dresser drawer.  In the process, they demonstrate the complex, amazing and, at times, difficult world of modern trade, development and global supply chains.  The teaser video is below, and the whole series is available here.  Take the time and watch/read the whole thing. They have really outdone themselves.

New Article: "America’s Horrible, No Good, Messed-Up Trade Policy (and How to Fix It)"

[Ed. note: This article was first published in The Federalist, which you really should be reading by now.]

Americans currently pay high taxes on food, clothing, automobiles, industrial inputs and other goods and services, and their own United States Trade Representative is vigorously fighting other countries to keep it that way. Even worse, the government’s efforts all but ensure that removing such taxes – and easing the artificial burdens they place on American families and businesses – will remain unnecessarily, and irrationally, difficult for years to come.
 

This is the awful state of American trade policy, and serious reform is long overdue.
 

Americans tend to think of the United States as some sort of free trade bastion in which unfettered globalization is – for better or worse – simply a way of life. However, while many U.S. tariffs were lowered decades ago, several tariff “peaks” remain in certain politically-connected areas like food, clothing, footwear and automobiles. Moreover, “non-tariff barriers” to trade – subsidies, regulations, etc. – have proliferated in recent years, and many “trade remedies” duties – based on allegations of “unfair” trade – also remain in place, particularly for industrial inputs like steel and chemicals.

The pros and (mostly) cons of these government measures vary, but one thing remains constant: their staunch and unflinching defense by the U.S. government in global free trade agreement negotiations. In these venues, gains are viewed as coming only from new access for U.S. exports and investment, while imports are the unfortunate price that America must pay for such “victories.” For example, as negotiations in both the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) gained momentum earlier this year, blubbering American journalists were quick to proclaim President Obama’s supposed “free trade renaissance” and strong support for expanding U.S. exports, but uniformly failed to report on the fact that his firm resistance to negotiating partners’ calls for lower U.S. trade barriers was a major reason for the agreements’ continuing difficulties. Nor did any such reports delve into the fact that those barriers, while certainly good for certain well-connected companies in the United States, injured the vast majority of American individuals and firms. And when TPP negotiators inevitably miss their much-ballyhooed and over-promised 2013 deadline for completing the agreement, you can bet that these facts will not receive top billing (or maybe even passing mention). Instead, only trading partners’ refusal to heed U.S. export demands will be blamed.

Trade and Reciprocity

The Obama administration, of course, is not the first to engage in such negotiating tactics and instead is simply the latest White House to do so. In fact, since the 1930s, American trade policy has utilized a “reciprocity” model of trade negotiations in which the United States treated any trade liberalization (e.g., the reduction of tariffs), no matter how smart or moral, as a “concession” that is only to be traded for another nations’ own acceptance of new U.S. exports or investment. Moreover, the diplomatic origins of the reciprocity model have ensured that trade liberalization is treated as a foreign, rather than domestic, policy area in which trade negotiations take on a zero-sum, war-like mentality where benefits are “won” or “lost”, instead of mutually achieved. Put most simply, exports are an unquestioned good to be pursued, while imports are an unmitigated bad to be resisted. Full stop.

Even though U.S. foreign and domestic policy – as well as economics, politics and society more broadly – has changed dramatically in the intervening decades, U.S. trade policy remains mired in this 20^th century, cold-war framework, as the current TPP and TTIP negotiations make abundantly clear. Unfortunately, some things to not get better with age, and U.S. trade policy is certainly one of those things. In fact, there are at least five fundamental problems with the United States’ mercantilist, reciprocity-based approach to international trade.
 

First and most basically, it is economically ignorant. Since Adam Smith first penned The Wealth of Nations, there has been a near-universal economic consensus in support of the elimination of trade barriers regardless of whether other nations do likewise. For this reason, there is quite literally no policy issue on which more economists – left, right and center – agree more, and the supposed death of the “free trade consensus” in academia has been wildly exaggerated.
 

This support, however, goes far beyond mere economic theory: there is also an endless array of empirical and historical evidence demonstrating the value of free trade and free markets. In fact, just last week the Heritage Foundation rounded up a lot of the latest data in order to (once again) resoundingly conclude that trade and investment liberalization is awesome, and that Congress should unilaterally eliminate tariffs on a wide range of products in order to boost the U.S. economy (including U.S. manufacturers). Heritage is certainly not alone: policy shops across the political spectrum, including Brookings, AEI and my colleagues at the Cato Institute, have produced similar studies in the past. And, as Dan Ikenson and I explained in a 2009 paper for Cato, the facts not only support free trade, but also destroy the various myths used by protectionists to undermine public support for such policies, including the greatly-exaggerated “death” of American manufacturing; the alleged link between imports, the trade deficit and U.S. jobs; and the idea that foreign companies and governments routinely cheat in order to gain an “unfair” advantage over their American counterparts.

Second, the reciprocity model has proven increasingly ineffective in producing tangible trade liberalization gains for U.S. businesses and consumers. The biggest example of this failure is WTO’s Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which remains comatose after 12 years of missed deadlines, unkept promises and angry finger-pointing among stubborn nations that refuse to make further “concessions” to finalize the multi-trillion-dollar deal. Even the WTO’s “mini package” of supposedly-low-hanging fruit – intended to jump-start Doha during this December’s ministerial meetings in Bali, Indonesia – appears in doubt.
 

Smaller, regional/bilateral deals aren’t faring much better. Indeed, according to a recent report from the Asian Development Bank, the entire TPP is at risk of collapsing due to nations’ demands for various protectionist exceptions (or “carve-outs”) from the deal’s general free trade and non-discrimination rules:

The need to provide exemptions, or “carve outs,” to avoid a collapse in negotiations also raises concerns over the final form the TPP will take. The secrecy surrounding the negotiations makes it difficult to assess progress, but—from what is known—there is the risk of degenerating into a series of loosely tied bilateral deals. Indications are that the two largest TPP members—the U.S. and Japan—are proceeding along bilateral lines, threatening the demanding single-undertaking approach the TPP is supposed to adopt. 

Although the number of countries involved in these negotiations is much lower than at the WTO, for instance, it does not translate to a commensurate reduction in diversity in terms of disparate interests. These interests often conflict, especially in a context where the agenda is far more ambitious than any other proposed thus far. The recent round of negotiations that took place in Brunei Darussalam in August 2013 was reported to have made very little progress, highlighting the difficulties being faced as the TPP moves toward finding common ground on the more difficult issues.

Bloomberg has more on the ADB report and the TPP’s current problems here. Among the carve-outs demanded by TPP participants are Japan’s agricultural protectionism and Malaysia’s imposition of discriminatory regulatory barriers to tobacco, but many such demands originate in Washington, including three of the negotiations’ most contentious issues:

• Sugar protectionism. The United States has not only resisted calls to liberalize archaic tariffs and quotas on sugar imports, but also refused to reopen the current U.S.-Australia FTA, which completely excludes sugar from the Agreement.
• Textiles, apparel and footwear. The Obama administration has repeatedly refused requests from Vietnam and other large exporters to lower U.S. tariffs on textiles, clothing and shoes, and has demanded complicated “rules of origin” that will dramatically narrow the goods that could qualify for preferential access to the U.S. market.
• Automobiles. The United States also has vigorously fought Japan over U.S. tariffs on automobiles (2.5% for cars and a whopping 25% for light trucks) – a nearly-identical request that delayed the implementation of the U.S.-Korea FTA for several years after it was originally signed by the Bush Administration.

Each of these issues not only hurts U.S. consumers (more on that below), but threatens the completion of the TPP itself – an absolutely dumbfounding prospect, given these sectors’ relative insignificance for both the agreement and the U.S. economy.

The third flaw in the current system is that it’s needlessly messy and archaic. Every U.S. FTA, from NAFTA to KORUS, contains a different “schedule” which dictates the level and timing new market access for individual FTA partners’ goods and services. Rules of origin and other commitments also vary widely across agreements, thus creating an impenetrable web of rules and regulations and making the U.S. tariff code look like the Rosetta Stone. As a result, the exact same product will be subject to different taxes and rules based solely on its origin and the year in which it enters the country, and U.S. businesses often make sourcing decisions based on FTA rules rather than a product’s actual value. (And, of course, they must spend millions of dollars annually to determine those rules!)

Not only is this process costly and inefficient, but it is wholly out of step with the 21^st century world of seamless and ever-changing global supply chains. Today, product components are often sourced from multiple countries and assembled in another, and sourcing patterns routinely change based on market developments. (See, e.g., the evergreen “origins” of the iPhone and its competitors.) Arcane trade rules prevent such dynamism and thus hurt U.S. companies and consumers. Put another way, goods today are “made on earth,” but our trade agreements reflect a bygone era of vertical manufacturers, simplistic designs and old-fashioned notions of bilateral trade among individual nations. It makes no sense. None.

Fourth, the United States’ “free trade” policy has proven to be a horrible tool for actually achieving and sustaining public support for trade liberalization and free markets. For one thing, focusing on exports, FTAs and arcane market access issues (e.g., pharmaceutical patent protections) gives many Americans the not-totally-unwarranted impression that our trade policy is little more than a tool of large multinational exporters and investors at the expense of American workers. That is hardly a way to achieve grassroots support for important economic policy!

More importantly, the constant focus on exports and resistance to any type of import liberalization actually breeds public misunderstanding and distrust of trade liberalization. As Dan Ikenson and I explained in 2011:

The pervasive view that exports are good and imports are bad is a central misconception upon which rests the belief that trade negotiations and “reciprocity” are essential to trade liberalization. Under this formulation, an optimal trade agreement, from the perspective of U.S. negotiators, is one that maximizes U.S. access to foreign markets and minimizes foreign access to U.S. markets. An agreement requiring large cuts to U.S. tariffs, which would thus deliver significant benefits to consumers, would not pass political muster unless it could be demonstrated that even larger export benefits were to be had. This misguided premise that imports are the cost of exports and should be minimized lies at the root of public skepticism about trade. Ironically, it is also a prominent feature of the favored pro-trade argument.

There is nothing, of course, wrong with exports or pursuing new market access for U.S. businesses. The political appeal of that message is obvious, and exports do contribute to economic growth and, thus, job creation. However, the U.S. government’s relentless obsession with exports and reciprocity not only confuses the public and reinforces bad economics, but also creates a large and unnecessary opening for misleading protectionists:

[The mecantilist] message invites the following retort: if exports help grow the economy and create jobs, then imports must shrink the economy and cost jobs. In failing to explain why that conclusion about imports is wrong, trade proponents have yielded the floor to trade skeptics, who have been more than happy to manufacture talking points about the “deleterious” impact of imports on the U.S. economy. Most of those talking points are misleading or plain wrong, but there has been inadequate effort to correct the record. As a result, too many Americans accept the mercantilist fallacy that exports are good, imports are bad, and the trade account is a scoreboard.

Birdcages across the country are lined with op-eds from protectionist union leaders, businessmen and “consumer protection” groups that turn FTA proponents’ mercantilist message against them. Indeed, just this month I was treated to a piece in my hometown paper from the NC AFL-CIO, arguing that the U.S.-Korea FTA – and U.S. free trade policy more broadly – was a clear disaster for North Carolina because imports from Korea increased in the agreement’s first year, while U.S. exports declined. (Nevermind the fact that Korea’s economy was struggling mightily in 2012 and thus represented a low-demand export market, or that free trade resoundingly benefits the Tarheel state.) Sadly, using the Obama administration’s own misguided metric for gauging an FTA’s success (i.e., exports and the trade balance), the union had a point and thus capably hoisted the administration on its own mercantilist petard. And until the U.S. government changes this shortsighted, incorrect approach to trade policy and messaging, this rhetorical weapon will be readily available to protectionists, and public opinion will remain subject to the whims of meaningless statistics instead of economic consensus and actual historical fact.

Trade and Morality

Finally, the current approach to U.S. trade policy is manifestly immoral. Government intervention in voluntary economic exchange on behalf of some citizens necessarily comes at the expense of others and is inherently unfair, inefficient, and subverts the rule of law. At their core, trade barriers like those for sugar, clothing, footwear and automobiles are the triumph of coercion and politics over free choice and economics. The protectionist policies that USTR fights to maintain are the result of productive resources being diverted to achieve political ends and, in the process, taxing unsuspecting consumers to line the pockets of the special interests that succeeded in enlisting the weight of the government on their side.
 

This immorality has a clear and tangible cost. In 2011, Americans paid over ten billion dollars in tariffs on clothing alone, and another two billion each for shoes and automobiles – $29 billion total that year and $40 billion total in 2012. These taxes also raise the prices of goods made here at home and, as a result, American families pay much more for everyday staples like butter, milk, ice cream, sugar, tuna, apparel and shoes than their foreign counterparts. And American companies do the same for industrial inputs like ball bearings, steel and cement.
 

Protectionism is akin to earmarks, but it comes out of the hides of American families and businesses instead of the general treasury. And under the current trade negotiations system, our government is essentially choosing certain U.S. businesses and workers – those seeking protection and those seeking new export markets – over everyone else in America. As a result of these taxpayer-funded efforts, U.S. families pay higher prices for everyday essentials, and import-consuming companies struggle to remain globally competitive. (See, for example, U.S. candy makers who have moved their operations, and thousands of jobs, overseas due to sky-high sugar prices here.) Why on earth should our government pursue such an obviously immoral approach to international economic policy? Obvious answer: it shouldn’t.

A Better Path Forward

Fortunately, there is a much better, simpler way forward for U.S. trade policy. Most obviously, the United States should (i) immediately and unconditionally eliminate tariffs on basic human necessities like food, clothing, shoes, as well as industrial inputs that U.S. manufacturers rely upon to remain globally competitive; and (ii) phase out all other tariffs over a relatively short transition period. This change, coupled with matching rhetorical shift about the domestic benefits of trade liberalization, would instantly put the United States back at the forefront of global economic policy and in line with longstanding economic doctrine, fundamental fairness and modern business practices.
 

And, contrary to popular belief, such moves are politically possible: not only have countries like Australia, Chile, China, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico and Colombia pursued unilateral import liberalization in recent years in order to boost their economies, but the U.S. government also has done so via more limited initiatives like the Generalized System of Preferences and the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill (and sold such policies by – rightly – emphasizing their benefits to U.S. businesses and consumers). These policies would resonate with policymakers on the right and left, particularly in this era of increasing bipartisan disdain for corporate welfare. They would be consistent both with conservatives’ principled opposition to higher taxes and big government interventionism, and with liberals’ opposition to regressive taxation.
 

Furthermore, the unilateral elimination of tariffs would not lead to a flood of “unfair” imports that destroy U.S. industry because we already have trade remedy laws designed to address such situations and, due to years of domestic industry lobbying, are extremely biased towards protection. (Not to mention the fact that the vast majority of imports are already “fairly traded.”)
 

Speaking of which, the United States also should pursue fundamental reforms of its trade remedy laws to ensure that they actually address unfair and injurious imports (rather than domestic lobbying) and take into account the broader public interest – including U.S. consumer concerns. Our government should be ever vigilant of the fact that American consumers, not foreign exporters or governments, pay U.S. “unfair” trade duties, and these measures should therefore be a last resort.

Other regulatory reforms also are necessary, such as the elimination of most U.S. subsidy programs and various forms of “regulatory protectionism,” such as the Lacey Act and Dodd-Frank rules on “conflict minerals,” all of which thwart competition, raise prices and distort domestic and global markets.
 

Finally, the United States should complement these important changes by coupling them with “American competitiveness agenda” in order to give U.S. workers and companies what they really need to compete in today’s global economy: lower individual and corporate taxes in order to reflect new global norms, limits on lawfare and professional/occupational licensing, energy deregulation, etc. Such changes would boost economic growth, eliminate most domestic demands for protection from low-cost foreign competition, and, combined with the aforementioned tariff liberalization, boost U.S. exports without the need for slow and messy reciprocal trade negotiations. (Remaining trade barriers could be addressed via more aggressive litigation of existing rights and obligations under WTO rules and a “name and shame” approach to the most egregious transgressors.)

The global economy is advancing at a breakneck pace, but U.S. trade policy is stuck in neutral. Our elected leaders ignore basic facts and economics and pursue negotiations that not only benefit a well-connected cabal of businesses and lobbyists at the expense of U.S. consumers, but also undermine long-term public support for free trade. This archaic, immoral approach has produced diminishing returns in recent years and has called into question almost 70 years of U.S. leadership in the global economy. Meanwhile, other countries press ahead with agendas that better serve their citizens and reflect the realities of modern global supply chains, multinational investment and other key aspects of the 21^st century economy.

It’s time America did the same.

I, Coffee

The miracles of capitalism and global supply chains never cease to amaze (at p. 142):

For instance, even the relatively simple GVC [global value chain] of Starbuck's (United States), based on one service (the sale of coffee), requires the management of a value chain that spans all continents; directly employs 150,000 people; sources coffee from thousands of traders, agents and contract farmers across the developing world; manufactures coffee in over 30 plants, mostly in alliance with partner firms, usually close to final market; distributes the coffee to retail outlets through over 50 major central and regional warehouses and distribution centres; and operates some 17,000 retail stores in over 50 countries across the globe. This GVC has to be efficient and profitable, while following strict product/service standards for quality. It is supported by a large array of services, including those connected to supply chain management and human resources management/development, both within the firm itself and in relation to suppliers and other partners. The trade flows involved are immense, including the movement of agricultural goods, manufactured produce, and technical and managerial services.

Maybe that's why a steaming cup of flavored water costs two bucks? (And even more in China.)

h/t David Henderson.

Fantastic Video: "I, Smartphone"

We free traders have often cited Apple's iPod, iPhone and iPad as perfect examples of the power of free trade and open markets.  Now there's a fantastic new video from the Institute for Faith, Work and Economics which plays off Leonard Read's classic "I, Pencil" essay (made famous by Milton Friedman) and, I think, more clearly demonstrates in three minutes the benefits of free markets, specialization and global supply chains than three years of my blog posts:



Awesome stuff.  Uncle Milty (whose 100th birthday is Tuesday) would be proud.

(h/t Andy Roth)

Made Everywhere (Thank Goodness)

Continuing one of this blog's main themes is this great new graphic from The Freeman, which shows that it's not just iPods, iPhones and iPads that are "made everywhere":

Unmentioned in the above are all the services associated with this same clothing - services like marketing and design at which the United States just so happens to excel:

Garment manufacturing is a low-cost commodity business. Most of the value in the apparel industry comes from design, technology, sales, marketing, and distribution—not manufacturing. The successful players in apparel, such as Ralph Lauren and Nike (NKE), figured this out long ago.

Because the economics are bad, most U.S. apparel manufacturing operations folded decades ago. Only 97,000 Americans still have jobs in apparel production, according to the U.S. Department of Labor, and most of them are making highly specialized products like DuPont (DD) Kevlar uniforms that cannot be made elsewhere.

But just because America doesn’t manufacture apparel anymore doesn’t mean we can’t lead the industry. In fact, the world’s largest apparel companies are almost all U.S.-based, including Nike, VF (VFC), PVH (PVH), and Ralph Lauren, to name a few. These companies have grown a combined 146 percent during the past 10 years, adding more than $27 billion in revenue. Nike has created more than 15,000 new jobs in the U.S. during this time, Ralph Lauren almost 10,000. And unlike the low-paying production jobs next to sewing machines, these are well-paying jobs in marketing, accounting, design, and management.

These companies are winning globally by out-designing, out-innovating, and out-marketing the competition. Nike, for example, is unveiling a new TurboSpeed running suit at the London Olympic Games that it claims can reduce 100-meter sprint times by .023 seconds. Nike’s gear will be used by teams from many countries, including Russia, China, and of course, the U.S.

What Nike and Ralph Lauren don’t do is make their own products, in the U.S. or elsewhere—and this has become their competitive advantage.

Both companies source products from hundreds of independent manufacturers in more than 30 countries (less than 3 percent coming from the U.S.). The flexibility allows them to be cost-competitive globally. It also allows their design teams to focus on creating the most exciting new products possible without having to worry whether they can be made on a legacy production line.

Remember Fruit of the Loom? Brown Shoe Co. (BWS)? Cannon Mills? Levi Strauss? In 1970 these were the largest U.S. apparel and fabric companies. They all owned their own U.S. manufacturing plants. They all struggled to innovate and grow, and they either went bankrupt or were bypassed by more nimble competitors who had no factories. If only they had outsourced …

Not only is outsourcing good for business, but the future of the American economy is dependent upon it.

In case you're wondering, it's basic economic facts like these that have Chinese politicians and commentators openly mocking protectionist US politicians like Sens. Harry Reid and Chuck Schumer for their latest Olympic hysteria. 

If only we could outsource them.

Umm, Yeah, About that "Made in China" iPad

Apple's iProducts continue to not only break sales records but also provide invaluable lessons on modern global supply chains and the pointlessness of bilateral trade deficit figures.  The WSJ's report on iFixit's teardown of the iPad3 the "new iPad" explains again why the back of the device should read "made on Earth":

The new iPad sports a speedier Apple-designed processor, a sharper screen and next-generation wireless Internet connections, known as 4G LTE.

Broadcom, a communications-chip specialist in Irvine, Calif., made the chips used for Bluetooth and wireless Internet access, iFixit said after posting a so-called teardown report from Australia. Chips from San Diego-based Qualcomm are used by the iPad to connect to cellular networks, including 4G services using a technology called LTE.

Elpida, a Japanese company that has filed bankruptcy proceedings, supplied dynamic-random access memory chips for the iPad, the site added. IFixit also identified other memory chips from Toshiba Corp., also based in Japan.

Other chips identified by iFixit came from companies that include Texas Instruments Inc., Fairchild Semiconductor International and TriQuint Semiconductor Inc....

One of the highest-profile suppliers to the iPad is Samsung, whose display had earlier been reported to be the only one that met Apple’s specifications for the high-resolution screen and was being used in the device. Competing displays from Sharp Corp. and LG Display Co. recently met Apple’s requirements, according to people familiar with the matter, and Sharp’s components are expected to begin shipping soon.

Samsung, which is currently locked in patent litigation with Apple, also the manufacturer of Apple’s third-generation processor, the A5X, according to iFixit. (The Korean company has built prior Apple-designed chips used in mobile devices). The firm said it found markings on the chip that said it was manufactured by Samsung in the first week of this year.

The iFixit breakdown makes clear that most of the iPad's components aren't made in China, but instead in Japan, Taiwan and, yes, even the United States.  Those parts are then shipped to China for final assembly.  Thus, the actual value accruing to Chinese iPad "manufacturers" is pretty low, while the suppliers all over the world reap much larger shares of the assembly costs.

The WSJ goes on to explain that the total component costs for the new iPad are $309, while the retail price for the 16GB model is $629.  Assuming that a new iPad imported into the United States registers as a $309 import from China (even though, again, little of that $309 cost is actually created in China), that means that over half of the iPad's final sales price is profit - profit going straight to Apple's employees and shareholders.

Impressive.

Given these facts, it's clear that anyone - like this guy - lamenting that a "made in China" iPad or the US-China trade deficit is somehow indicative of the "death of US manufacturing" (or the need to "get tough" on Chinese trade practices) simply has no idea how the global economy actually works or how modern global supply chains have rendered many trade statistics completely worthless.

As I've repeatedly stated, many campaigning politicians continue to cite the US-China trade deficit as some sort of "proof" that China is eating our trade lunch, even though the iPod/iPhone/iPad examples and global supply chains more broadly have been widely reported for years now.  So, once again, either these politicians are utterly clueless or they're being completely disingenuous.

I guess it could be both.

NEWSFLASH: Administration Still Clueless About Global Competitiveness

Last week, I detailed why the Obama Administration's fiscal policies were utterly clueless when it came to improving US businesses' global competitiveness.  Those criticisms remain valid, and perhaps even more so, now that the White House has released its big corporate tax "reform" plan (to see why, go here, here, here, here and here - for starters).  Thus, I'm going to ignore the President's campaign talking points tax "plan" and focus on another critical aspect of US companies' international competitiveness that the President and his advisers completely ignore: import liberalization and global supply chains.

Now, this isn't the first time that I've exposed the administration's blind spot when it comes to the clear connection between duty-free access to imports and US companies' ability to compete and "win" in the global economy.  (And I'm certainly not the only one.)  But a new piece by trade gadfly Greg Rushford really hits this point home by repeatedly documenting the abject silliness (and economic ignorance) that is the President's mercantilist obsession with exports (and concomitant disregard for imports).  In the piece, Rushford follows President Obama's recent "Made In America" road trip - in which he trumpets various companies' export successes - and then explains the dirty little secret behind that success: imports and even - gasp! - outsourcing.

First, President Obama on February 15th traveled to a Master Lock factory in Milwaukee to proclaim that "[w]e need an economy that is built to last, that is built on American manufacturing, and American know-how, and American-made energy, and skills for American workers, and the renewal of American values of hard work and fair play and shared responsibility."  What he failed to mention, however, is how Master Lock actually does business:

In Milwaukee, Master Lock now employs more than 400 workers, some 100 of them having been brought back from its Chinese facilities. The company also has about 700 more workers in Nogales, Mexico. Together, the Milwaukee and Nogales plants account for perhaps 55 percent of the company's lock production, with the remainder still in China, according to press reports....

And while praising Master Lock's manufacturing exports, President Obama failed to mention how the company's product is, you know, actually manufactured:

While at first glance, a padlock seems like a pretty simple thing to make, Master Lock's unionized Milwaukee work force has reason to know otherwise. Master Lock's vice president for global supply chains, Bob Rice, wrote a memo to the company's Asian suppliers last year, listing as examples 20 different products the company needed to import from China, each with its own SKU number.

Locks have parts that come from just about anywhere: keys, cylinders assemblies, ball bearings, plated shackle stop pins, anti-saw pins, screws, cylinder external assemblies, cases and cylinder retainer blocks. In 1995, the last year for which publicly available documentation is available for U.S. Customs' records, Master Lock made nine of 11 such components in Milwaukee. But the lock case and cylinder retainer block were needed from Taiwan --- and those two parts represented an estimated 25- 35% of the total cost of the finished padlock.

More recently, in 2010 Master Lock made U.S. Customs officials work a bit to determine where one padlock model was really made. The padlock was made of ten different components from various countries, with the principal components being a lock body made in Milwaukee and a shackle from China. All the components were then assembled in Mexico. Customs determined that the finished padlock should be marketed as a product of Mexico --- but that "Mexican" padlock also employed workers from Milwaukee to the Middle Kingdom.

Sometimes, Master Lock imports parts from Mexico, like unfinished padlock lock bodies and shackle assemblies that are then finished in Milwaukee, where the cylinder locks are attached. Those padlocks are labeled Made in USA --- but again, there's more to the American success story. Workers of the World: you have really become united....

Odd that Obama left these important facts out, huh?  It's almost as if he doesn't care about using the loudest microphone in the world to spread economic ignorance.  But I digress...

Rushford then follows President Obama to a Boeing plant in Everett, Washington to show that the company's production of the new 787 Dreamliner "is a great example of how we can bring jobs and manufacturing back to America."  Obama added that his administration wanted "to make it easier for companies like Boeing to sell their products all over the world, because more exports mean more jobs."  However:

The president didn't admit what every economist would immediately recognize: to export those Dreamliners, Boeing's workers need access to raw materials and components from all over the world.

Dreamliners may be Made in America, but with essential imports sourced from so many other places that it's difficult to know where to begin. There's the Integrated Surveillance System Processor and an Integrated Navigation Radio, from Canada. There's also a Valve Control Unit from Germany --- passengers can thank that for keeping their cabin air pressure within tolerable limits. And there's a turbine engine exhaust nozzle, brought in from Mexico from titanium sheets made in China. Those are just the first three telling examples that show up from a glance through US Customs records --- with each import necessary to the American workers in places like Everton.

That doesn't even get to the big-ticket items: the Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 engine, the testing in wind tunnels in the UK and France; the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' wing; Italian horizontal stabilizers, doors from France, and other critical components from Sweden, India, South Korea --- it's a very long list. The Dreamliner is as cosmopolitan as the American people. Boeing's American workers should love imports, because their jobs depend upon them.

Finally, Rushford explains that it's not just US manufacturing companies that benefit from import liberalization and global supply chains.  Services firms, like those who helped build Miller Park in Milwaukee, also reap major dividends:

Miller Park was built by American (union) workers, with tons and tons of domestic materials. But that's not the whole story. The subcontractor for the stadium's renowned retractable steel roof was Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Mitsubishi bought high-strength steel from Luxembourg, which was shipped to Mitsubishi fabrication yards in China and Japan. The finished steel components were then shipped to the Port of Los Angeles, where they were unloaded by American longshoremen and then driven by Teamsters to Milwaukee.
Other steel that went into Miller Park came up the Mississippi River from the Port of New Orleans, according to sources at that port. And Haven Steel Products, Inc., headquartered in Kansas City, made the steel for the stadium's bowl that supports the roof. Other key work was done by Wisconsin Electrical Power Co.,not to mention the intrepid workers who put in the all-important beer-supply pipes.

Arup, the United Kingdom's experienced design firm, was responsible for most of the engineering design for Miller Park, working also with design teams from Dallas, Los Angeles, and Milwaukee. Arup, headquartered in London, has sent its consultants and engineers just about everywhere in recent decades: including New York's Tappan Zee Bridge, the 2nd Ave. Subway; Japan's Kansai International Airport, and the Sydney Opera House. Miller Park, like the others, was truly Made in the World....

Back when President Obama announced his National Export Initiative in 2010, I first highlighted the administration's odd habit of trumpeting US exporters who just so happen to rely on imports.  Rushford's piece makes clear that the White House hasn't kicked that habit and remains as economically uninformed as ever (well, at least publicly).

And just in case you think that Rushford and I are cherry-picking, think again.  The 2012 Economic Report of the President - quietly released last week - shows that the Obama administration's complete disregard for import liberalization is very much intentional.  That report's section on International Trade and Finance goes to great lengths to (i) praise goods and services exports (particularly the increase in US exports since their post-crash nadir in 2009); (ii) denigrate goods and services imports (for, example by lamenting the trade deficit and lauding opportunities to decrease exports of services imports); and (iii) not mention - even once! - the demonstrably positive effects of import liberalization on US firms' global competitiveness (despite spending several pages on ways to improve such competitiveness).  This complete disregard for import liberalization is, in my estimation, a new low (previously set by the President's 2010 Trade Policy Agenda) and a serious step backwards from the administration's much-improved 2011 Agenda.

If the President and his economic team can't even mention such an obvious and critical aspect of American businesses' ability to compete in today's global economy, then why on earth should we trust them on related issues like tax reform?


Oh, right, we shouldn't.

NY Fed: Labor Costs & Inflation Drive Rapid Increase in Chinese Consumer Goods Prices

In a must-read article, the NY Fed studies the prices of Chinese imports into the United States and comes to some very interesting conclusions.  First, the basics:

We find that, in a sharp reversal of earlier trends, U.S. import prices for consumer goods shipped from China have been rising rapidly in recent quarters—by 7 percent between 2010:Q2 and 2011:Q1. 

Second, the authors explain that appreciation of China's currency appears to have had a direct and measurable effect on Chinese imports of commodity-intensive industrial supplies (e.g., steel), but had far less (if any) effect on consumer goods like the iPod:

[B]etween 1997 and 2005, when the RMB was pegged to the dollar, prices in all major categories of imports from China were on a downward trend. This trend reversed itself when the RMB was allowed to appreciate against the dollar in 2005.

By separating commodity-intensive industrial supply prices from other categories, we see that between 2005 and 2009 higher import prices of goods from China were mainly driven by jumps in industrial supply prices—goods that rely heavily on commodity inputs. Over this four-year period, consumer prices only increased 7 percent, even though the nominal RMB appreciated 20 percent against the dollar.

This pattern changed in mid-2010, when the RMB started to appreciate again. Import prices of consumer goods rose by 7 percent between 2010:Q2 and 2011:Q1, a period in which the nominal RMB appreciated 4 percent against the dollar and the CPI-adjusted real RMB appreciated nearly twice as much.

Third, the authors explain that labor costs and inflation, not RMB appreciation, are very likely causing the recent price increases for Chinese consumer goods imports:

Sharply increasing wages for Chinese workers and other escalating costs faced by Chinese firms in the country’s coastal manufacturing export hubs may be contributing to the rising prices of consumer goods shipped to the United States. Indeed, heightened unrest by workers demanding improvements in pay and double-digit wage-increase settlements have been making headlines in recent years (see, for example, Economic Times, New York Times, and Financial Times). Although data used to construct manufacturing unit labor costs are far from ideal, we estimate that wage-based unit labor costs resumed their upward trend in 2010 at the fastest pace in at least a decade, after dipping in 2009 due to a softening of China’s manufacturing labor market during the global economic crisis (see chart below). Moreover, the government enacted a major new labor law in 2008 that has likely driven up overall costs for firms.

Fourth, the authors discuss why economic growth and demographic issues will probably cause Chinese labor costs to keep rising, thus jeopardizing China's global dominance as a low-cost manufacturer:

Cyclical and structural factors are likely contributing to the rise in Chinese manufacturing unit labor costs. In particular, strong wage growth has partly reflected the very rapid cyclical recovery of Chinese manufacturing following the post-Lehman global trade shock, as well as the role of stimulus policy in generating greater incentives for migrant workers to stay closer to their home provinces inland rather than move to the coast to find jobs. Structurally, China is generally acknowledged to be undergoing a profound demographic shift to a rapidly aging society at an unusually early stage in economic development. China’s prime manufacturing cohort of people ages fifteen to thirty-nine has already peaked in size, and the United Nations projects that the working-age population as a whole will peak sometime over the next decade (see chart below). This implies that the days of seemingly limitless “surplus” labor supply may be nearing an end. And indeed, anecdotal reports of labor shortages in China’s coastal manufacturing provinces have surfaced periodically since at least 2003 (see, for example, Financial Times and “Chinese Workers Get Perks—Labor Shortage Spurs Firms to Court Factory Employees Pressure on Pay—and Prices,” Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2004)—about the time manufacturing unit labor costs started to rise....

Firms may be able to partially adapt to heightened labor shortages in China’s coastal manufacturing hubs by enhancing efforts to raise productivity and by moving factories inland, where labor remains considerably cheaper. However, over the longer term, the demographic shift facing China is real, as is the government’s desire to encourage faster household income growth, rebalance the economy away from investment and toward consumption, encourage the development of inland provinces, and develop higher-value-added industries. This suggests that while China’s days as the world’s factory may not be numbered, the prospect of continued rising prices of Chinese goods seems highly likely.

Finally, the authors explain what rising Chinese import costs will mean for the American economy (hint: it's not good):

More expensive consumer goods from China would represent a significant shift in U.S. inflation pressures, given China’s history of being a low-cost supplier of consumer goods to the United States. While it is difficult to assess the precise impact of changes in import prices on U.S. inflation, there are a number of channels we can identify. First, higher prices of imported consumer goods contribute directly to the U.S. CPI. Second, imported goods also enter into the production of domestic goods as some of these are intermediate inputs, which contribute directly to U.S. producers’ costs and thus add further pressure to increase the price of domestic goods. Third, higher import prices of Chinese goods may allow competitors, which include other exporters to the United States and domestic producers, to also charge higher prices and thus increase their mark-ups. Alternatively, competitors may try to gain market share by keeping their prices low and thus offset some of the inflationary pressures from the higher import prices of Chinese goods.

In short, higher Chinese import prices mean inflationary pain for American families and companies, and any lost Chinese market share will be replaced not only by domestic producers but also other foreign competitors.

Given all of these facts, why are American politicians attacking China's currency policies again?   To maybe help a few US companies who produce commodity-intensive industrial supplies, while definitely harming many more US companies, consumers and workers who directly benefit from low-priced Chinese imports?

Oh, right: they're doing it precisely because they're politicians.

(h/t Mark Perry)

Protectionists Must Have Nightmares about the iPod

From Mark Perry comes even more proof that the iPod is a protectionist's worst nightmare.  I've already documented the growing number of iPod (and iPhone) studies which show that the modern global economy isn't, as our President and many other politicians claim, some sort of ruthless, zero-sum, "us versus them" competition among nations.  (Think Thunderdome without the bungee cords.)  The earlier "iPod studies" analyzed the iPod's and iPhone's global design and manufacturing processes and showed how, even though the gadgets say "Made in China," it's America, not China, that gets most of the profits from their sale.  The studies thereby demonstrated how modern global supply chains (i) have turned bilateral trade statistics into worthless measures of trade policy and (ii) can provide huge benefits for Americans beyond the obvious cost savings, even when the product at issue is wholly assembled abroad.

Now comes a new study published in the Journal of International Commerce and Economics which shows the dramatic benefits that the iPod's global manufacturing process - and American innovation more generally - deliver to the American workforce.  The abstract gives the study's basics:

Globalization skeptics argue that the benefits of globalization, such as lower consumer prices, are outweighed by job losses, lower earnings for U.S. workers, and a potential loss of technology to foreign rivals. To shed light on the jobs issue, we analyze the iPod, which is manufactured offshore using mostly foreign-made components. In terms of headcount, we estimate that, in 2006, the iPod supported nearly twice as many jobs offshore (27,250, see chart above) as in the United States (13,920). Yet the total wages paid in the United States ($746 million, see chart above) amounted to more than twice as much as those paid overseas ($318 million). Driving this result is the fact that Apple keeps most of its research and development (R&D) and corporate support functions in the United States, providing thousands of high-paid professional and engineering jobs that can be attributed to the success of the iPod. This case provides evidence that innovation by a U.S. company at the head of a global value chain can benefit both the company and U.S. workers.

Cool.  Perry also provides a great table to demonstrate the authors' topline data point:

The study's authors then conclude:

When innovative products are designed and marketed by U.S. companies, they can create valuable jobs for American workers even if the products are manufactured offshore. Apple’s tremendous success with the iPod and other innovative products in recent years has driven growth in U.S. employment, even though these products are made offshore. These jobs pay well and employ people with college degrees. They are at the high end of what might be considered middle class jobs and appear to be less at risk of vanishing from the United States than production jobs.

In short, even when an American-designed product is made overseas, it can - and often does - support tens of thousands of American jobs at pretty great pay.  And, oh, yeah, other countries benefit too.  Very, very cool.

So much for that ruthless competition, eh?

p.s. For those of you who might claim that we could have even more jobs if we lobbied the US government to force Apple to produce and assemble their gadgets in the United States, you'd be wrong: the devices would necessarily cost more to produce - maybe a lot more.  Thus, these "American iPods" would, at best, result in fewer sales and fewer support jobs (and R&D into new, supercool Apple stuff), and, at worst, they wouldn't exist at all when priced entirely out of the market.

Monday Quick Hits (World Champion Dallas Mavericks Edition)

I'm sure that you, like me, are still tired from celebrating the Mavs' ridiculously unexpected victory last night. So here's a little pick-me-up:

• Sec. Clinton: Free trade is great for everyone (except Americans!).  In all seriousness, if you've ever wondered whether the Obama administration's free trade foot-dragging reflects political opportunism or a sincere-yet-misguided misunderstanding of basic economics, wonder no longer.

• WTO Director General Pascal Lamy explains that, because of global supply chains, value-added is a much better way to measure trade flows, and old school trade stats "give us a distorted picture of trade imbalances between countries." A full WTO report on this issue gives us a detailed understanding of the abject absurdity of politicians' breathless claims about global trade imbalances based on the old metrics.  For example, on our elected officials' currency demagoguery, Lamy stated: "When products include many parts made in many other countries, the effect of an isolated exchange rate appreciation or depreciation to the selling price in export markets will be reduced to the domestic content of these exports, to its 'value added content'. This may explain why empirical studies about the impact of exchange rate changes on imbalances tend to show they only have limited or ambiguous effects."  Translation: the demagoguery is pretty much baseless.  Heritage's Bryan Riley has more on our misleading trade stats here.

• In a must-read editorial, George Will absolutely destroys the White House's refusal to submit pending FTAs to Congress without congressional assurances on expanded Trade Adjustment Assistance.  My favorite lines: "A government borrowing $58,000 a second cannot afford Obama’s policy of Stimulus Forever, and there is this problem with TAA at any level: It is unjust to treat some workers as more entitled than others to protection from the vicissitudes of economic dynamism. Consider a hypothetical Ralph, who operated Ralph’s Diner until Applebee’s and Olive Garden opened competitors in the neighborhood. With economies of scale and national advertising budgets, those two franchises could offer more choices at better prices, so Ralph’s Diner went out of business. Should he and his employees be entitled to extra taxpayer subventions because they are casualties of competition? Why should someone be entitled to such welfare just because he or she is affected negatively by competition that comes from abroad rather than down the street? Because national trade policy permits foreign competition? But national economic policy permits — indeed encourages, even enforces — domestic competition. In 2001, when approximately 80,000 people worked in 7,500 music stores, the iPod was invented. Largely because of that and other technological changes, today only about 20,000 people work in 2,500 music stores. Should those 60,000 people be entitled to extra welfare because they are “victims” of technology? Does it matter if the 60,000 have found work in new jobs — perhaps making or selling electronic devices? In 2008, Americans bought 1.4 billion books made of paper and 200 million e-books. Soon they will buy more e-books than paper books, and half the nation’s bookstores will be gone. Should the stores’ former employees be entitled to special assistance beyond unemployment compensation? Reactionary liberalism holds that existing jobs must be protected with policies that reduce the economic dynamism that would mean a net increase in American jobs. So the dreary probability is that even if the TAA entitlement were re-enriched to stimulus levels, Democrats would again move the goal posts, concocting new objections to the trade agreements."  Yep. 

• Speaking of TAA, I quite enjoyed this NYT op-ed from former Bush official Matthew Slaughter and former Clinton official Robert Lawrence about how to resolve the White House's self-imposed TAA/FTA impasse.  Their solution: (i) pass the FTAs as soon as humanly possible, and then (ii) scrap TAA and the current mishmash of other federal unemployment benefits and replace the ancient, broken programs with a more streamlined and rational system that is market-friendly and doesn't discriminate against Americans who lost their jobs due to technology or something other than (allegedly) trade policy.  I don't agree with everything they propose, but I love this idea (and have advocated something similar for a few years now): "enabling unemployed workers to make penalty-free withdrawals from savings accounts like 401(k)’s and I.R.A.’s to finance costs like occupational retraining and relocation."  Sadly, the chances of this deer-in-the-headlights White House actually doing something as rational and economically-beneficial as the Slaughter/Lawrence plan are, well, not good.

• Is the, ahem, "Chicago way" coming to Geneva?  The Peterson Institute's Gary Clyde Hufbauer reports on what he sees as a very troubling development at the WTO: USTR's attempt to block Appellate Body member Jennifer Hillman from serving a second term on the world's most important arbiter of trade disputes: "The United States has never before blocked its Appellate Body appointee from serving a second term. Since the USTR has offered no explanation for blocking Hillman, suspicions are bound to arise that the United States is displeased with her decisions on the AB and wants to name a judge who is more attentive to US positions in future cases. These suspicions are bound to erode confidence in the WTO judicial system, and create a chilly reception for Hillman’s successor appointee. 'Judicial independence' is a hallowed American concept, now enshrined in the WTO.... But as a member of the bar, as well as President, Obama should seriously reconsider this damaging precedent."

• Does CNBC get just how contradictory this ridiculous news story about the Japan tragedy and the US trade deficit is?  Compare and contrast (emphasis mine): "The after-effects from the March earthquake and tsunami in Japan left behind one on the US economy: An unexpected shrinking in the massive trade deficit. But that improvement may not last long….  Most of the $3.1 billion decline came from Japan and a $2.5 billion drop in auto-related imports. The tsunami devastated the Japanese auto industry, slowing parts distribution and production essential to US car manufacturing and sales."  So to recap: choking off essential inputs for US manufacturers is a "positive impact."  Riiiiight.  (h/t Bryan Riley) 

• The Mises Institute's Jeff Tucker explains how US treatment of Vietnamese catfish basa and swai is an "archetype of disgusting protectionism."  Yep.

• In case you're wondering, inflation and rising labor costs aren't isolated to China.  According to the WSJ, India's facing similar issues: "Maruti Suzuki India, the local unit of Suzuki Motor, is facing what's become a familiar hazard in the country: labor action. On Wednesday, a strike by about 2,000 workers at one plant entered the fourth day. With $9 million of potential revenue lost each day from the closure, the total is about $32 million, or close to 1.5% of last quarter's revenue. Maruti's troubles are the latest reminder of the effect of labor unrest as workers demand better wages and benefits, triggered partly by high inflation. Last month, a similar protest by the employees of national carrier Air India lasted nine days, causing a revenue hit of $30 million. In 2010, Hyundai Motor India had to rehire most of the employees it had sacked after a two-day protest that cost a similar amount."

• Slate's Bryan Palmer explains why Europe "sucks" at innovation.  The intro reads like an article from The Onion: "The French government has banned television reporters from using the words Twitter and Facebook when referring generically to social media, because all that free advertising gives the companies an unfair advantage." Sacre bleu! 

• Bloomberg's editors go back to basics, explaining why protectionism is politically attractive yet economically stupid.  The whole thing is worth reading, but I really enjoyed this quote: "Furthermore, the benefits of free trade do not require reciprocity. Avoiding tariffs and quotas is good for us whether China, Japan or Europe follow suit."  Exactly.

• In case you need further evidence of the White House's secret understanding of free trade's myriad benefits, here's video of CIA Director (and current Secretary of Defense nominee) Leon Panetta explaining the strategic importance of free trade, especially with our allies in Korea, Colombia and Panama (start at 6:04, with Sen. Rob Portman's smart line of questioning):

Panetta: Senator, I think that when it comes to protecting our security there are number of areas that have to be addressed and one of those obviously is not just the military responsibility but there is an economic side of this that plays a very important role in terms of promoting better security. The ability of these other countries to develop trade with us to develop their economies creates greater stability within those countries. I think that’s a fact and to the extent that we can help promote that kind of trade, that we can promote that kind of economic development, I think it assists these nations in their ability to achieve stability. Columbia is a good example. They have done a great job going after narco trafficking. If we can help, you know be able to help them develop their economy, that could become another added factor in providing greater security in that region and the same thing is obviously true for Korea.

That's all for tonight.  Go Mavs!

Short Article, Big Lessons

From Colombia Reports comes a great article that, on its face, seems to be just a short piece about foreign investment, but actually provides several great lessons about the global economy:

Colombia's largest cement company Argos has bought several cement plants in Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina for $760 million, reported local media Thursday.

Argos Cements bought the plants from the French company Lafarge. Argos entered the US market in 2005 and says it plans to become the fourth largest ready mix producer in the U.S.

Chief Executive Jose Velez said in an interview as reported by Dow Jones "We are conservative in our outlook but we do expect more activity in 2010." Velez also said that he is not worried by the weak dollar or the strong peso.

"Because of the weakness of the dollar most of our inputs are cheaper now ... The net impact of the appreciation [of the peso] is zero at this time."

The purchase, which is still subject to approval from U.S. regulators, is part of an long term expansion strategy aimed at consolidating Argos' presence in the U.S. market.

So what kind of lessons can we draw from these few paragraphs?  Here's what I came up with:

• The obvious benefits of foreign investment in the US economy.  But for Argos' investment, these French-owned cement plants in Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina may have gone out of business, eliminating hundreds of American manufacturing jobs in the process.  Now, let's just hope that those "US regulators" don't foul things up.

• Where all that great foreign investment wants to go.  All of Argos' $760 million investment is going to Right to Work States. i.e., states with laws prohibiting compulsory union membership.  Of course, as I've often noted here, foreign investment in these states - particularly those in the South - is part of a growing trend.  In fact, the empirical evidence shows that RTW states attract more FDI than their forced-unionization counterparts.  Of course, the economic dominance of RTW states isn't isolated to attracting foreign investment.  As Steve Moore and Art Laffer recently noted in a great WSJ op-ed: "As of today there are 22 right-to-work states and 28 union-shop states. Over the past decade (2000-09) the right-to-work states grew faster in nearly every respect than their union-shop counterparts: 54.6% versus 41.1% in gross state product, 53.3% versus 40.6% in personal income, 11.9% versus 6.1% in population, and 4.1% versus -0.6% in payrolls."

• How global supply chains erode the conventional wisdom on trade and currency and make import liberalization increasingly important.  Velez states: "Because of the weakness of the dollar most of our inputs are cheaper now ... The net impact of the appreciation [of the peso] is zero at this time."  This means that his company is importing raw materials from the United States or from countries whose currencies are pegged to the dollar.  Either way, it's a great example of how global supply chains have made old school currency dogma irrelevant, and why a strong currency and the elimination of import barriers are important for intermediate/downstream producers like, oh I don't know, the United States.  Now, if only there were a way for the United States and Colombia to instantly lower the vast majority of their bilateral trade barriers.  Oh, wait.

• The origins of that Colombian investment capital - the US-Colombia trade deficit.  One of the constant refrains here is that trade deficits are not "bad things" because, among other things, they necessarily lead to foreign investment in the United States.  As Cafe Hayek's Don Boudreaux put it, "another name for 'U.S. trade deficit' is 'U.S. capital-account surplus' – that is, inflows of investment funds into America that supply (directly or indirectly) financing for more capital creation in America."  (Mark Perry adds more here.)  In 2010, the United States had a $3.6 billion bilateral trade deficit with Colombia, and now $760 million is coming back to the U.S. as investment in domestic cement plants.  In short, Americans gave Argos and other Colombian firms our dollars, and now they're re-investing those dollars in the US economy.  Suddenly, those trade deficits aren't so scary anymore, eh?

I'm sure I missed something.  Feel free to add your lessons in the comments.

(h/t Monica Showalter)

Caterpillar CEO on Trade and How to (Really) Win The Future

President Obama and his underlings just love to talk about improving American competitiveness in order to Win the Future.  But what does the US business community - well, those not on the milky-end of the government teet - think about the current state of American policy and its impact on our companies' future global competitiveness?  Courtesy of HotAir comes a fantastic CNBC interview with the CEO of Caterpillar - one the shining stars of America's thriving manufacturing sector - on just those issues.  It's well worth your 15 minutes:



In short, Mr. Oberhelman sees the global economy not as a threat, but as a great business opportunity.  He's smartly positioned Caterpillar to take full advantage of both foreign and domestic market conditions - through things like advocating robust trade liberalization, currency hedging and maintaining near-total control over business operations in interventionist foreign markets - and he sees competitiveness-killing US government policies, not free trade or low-cost competitors in China or Brazil, as the greatest threat to his company's viability and the future of the American economy.

And what kind of US government policies are undermining our global competitiveness and thus jepoardizing our companies and jobs?  I'll let Oberhelman explain:



My favorite quote:

We've announced three or four arguably brand-new facilities [in the United States] bringing work in from outside. And frankly we weigh all of these things in which state is the most business friendly. It's not a question of labor cost or who's cheaper. If you chase cheap labor around the world, you're never going to win. It's a lot more than that. The state's got to be competitive.  The country's got to be competitive....  You see states going the other way [from Illinois], where they're very pro-business and reducing taxes, and guess where we land our plants that are very competitive.... The latest and greatest is in Texas.  We brought a plant that in the past has assembled hydraulic excavators in Japan for shipment to the U.S.... we've moved that plant to south Texas... 5,000 to 6,000 units a year, 600 to 700 high-paying assembly jobs.

Nice.  And how exactly does Mr. Oberhelman think the current administration is doing to keep American companies strong and competitive?  Well, the answer to that is in the second video, but I'll let HotAir spell it out for you.

(Hint: it's not good.)

The Unbearable Asininity and Immorality of Donald Trump's China "Policy"

I was really hoping to stay out of the whole "Donald Trump is Running for President" thing, because I truly believed (and pretty much still do) that (a) the spectacle was just a really good, and slightly depressing, publicity stunt for the reality TV star; and (b) anything I said would just give the guy another free commercial (albeit for an extremely limited market).  Thus, any discussion of this unserious "candidate's" completely unserious "trade policy" - which is literally nothing more than the immediate imposition of tariffs on all Chinese imports - was really just a waste of my and, by extension, your time.  

But then I saw the (admittedly early and utterly unpredictive) polls, and then I read that he's deathly serious about running for President, and then I went on the Laura Ingraham Show and found that smart conservatives like Laura (and a lot of her listeners) actually sympathized with Trump's "get tough on China" plan.

So here I am wasting a quiet Easter Weekend screaming into the interwebs about Donald Trump's - Donald Freaking Trump's - China trade policy.  I hate to say it, but this really does need to be done.  So let's just hold our collective noses and get this over with.

As noted above, Trump's entire trade policy boils down to slapping unilateral tariffs on all Chinese imports as soon as he gets into office.  Here's the man himself describing his big plan to NBC News:

"I would tell China, very nicely, fellows, you are my friend, I like you very much. I've made a lot of money on China by the way, a lot of money with China. I would say we are going to put a 25 percent tax on all your products coming in, and that's going to do a number of things," Trump said.

"Number one: as soon as they believe it's going to happen, they will behave so nicely, because it would destroy their economy,” said Trump in an interview with NBC’s Today show on Tuesday.

Playing up to voter fears on the loss of jobs to China, Trump said the transfer of cash to the Chinese was down to Beijing’s controversial currency peg.

"When you see what China is doing to us, what we're going to lose this year, $300 billion to China. And they are taking all of our jobs, and they are doing it through manipulation of their currency," Trump said.

Trump's China policy is wrong on just about every possible level: factually, legally, economically, strategically, morally and even politically.  Let's systematically address each of these now.

1. Trump gets his basic facts wrong. 

Before we get to Trump's tariff policy itself, it's important to understand the serial fallacy of Trump's basic factual assertions, i.e., that (a) China's currency remains extremely undervalued versus the US dollar; (b) China's currency policies are driving both the US-China trade balance and US unemployment; and (c) that the US trade deficit, and especially the United States' bilateral trade deficit with China, is a big problem for the US economy.

As I've noted here many times, China's currency policies are not nearly the vehicle of economic destruction that Trump and others claim them to be.  First, Trump erroneously focuses on the nominal US-China exchange rate (what the government says the currency is worth), rather than the real exchange rate (what the currency is actually worth).  It's the real rate that matters, as any "businessman" like Trump should know,  because it measures what tradeable goods and services actually cost.  And, as I've noted repeatedly here, the real dollar-yuan exchange rats has increased dramatically - almost 50% percent - since 2005.  Second, as the real value of China's currency has increased, American unemployment has gone from about 5% in 2005 to slightly under 9% today, and the US-China trade deficit has (except for the recession) steadily increased.  So there's no strong connection between China' currency and total American jobs or the trade balance (as the Congressional Research Service has repeatedly noted).

Next, Trump's assertion that $300 billion annual US-China trade deficit is a sign that America is "losing at trade" is the height of economic ignorance.  First, there's actually a strong correlation between US economic growth and an expanding US trade deficit.  As Cato's Dan Griswold recently wrote in a must-read paper on the subject:

An examination of the past 30 years of U.S. economic performance offers no evidence that a rising level of imports or growing trade deficits have negatively affected the U.S. economy. In fact, since 1980, the U.S. economy has grown more than three times faster during periods when the trade deficit was expanding as a share of GDP compared to periods when it was contracting. Stock market appreciation, manufacturing output, and job growth were all significantly more robust during periods of expanding imports and trade deficits.

And if fixating on the overall US trade balance weren't dumb enough, Trump goes one further and obsesses over an even more economically meaningless stat when he worries about the US-China trade balance.  As I've noted here repeatedly, the proliferation of global supply chains and multinational investment has rendered bilateral trade balances a totally unimportant trade policy metric.  Indeed, old school trade stats like these have become so obsolete that the WTO has launched a new global initiative to determine how better to account for actual trade flows.  The most common example of the indisputable obsolescence of the US-China trade deficit is the iPhone (and the iPod before that): each device imported into the US from China accounts for about $300 towards the bilateral trade deficit, yet the Chinese get only about six bucks worth of value from the item's assembly and shipment.  Meanwhile, the US-based Apple and its affiliates get hundreds of dollars from an iPhone's final US sale (for things like design, marketing, and even some manufacturing).

Even the idea that China is totally dominating the United States is absurd.  Yes, China has experienced impressive GDP growth, but (a) that's what developing countries do; and (b) America is still much, much wealthier, greener, and more productive.  Moreover, China's incessant quest for GDP growth through industrial planning has led to some pretty scary inflation (which is driving China's the increase in the Yuan's real value), some major league economic distortions (e.g., a frightening property bubble and an increasingly troublesome high-speed rail system), and a lot of other serious problems that, if not solved pretty quickly, could implode the entire Chinese economy.  Always the empiricist, Trump once "proved" how China was "eating our lunch" by noting how big and shiny China's cities are.  Well, on that, he's right, but that's because no one is actually living in them.  I mean, it's so easy to keep a city clean without the, you know, citizens.

There are several other factual problems with Trump's assertions, but let's just forget about these big flaws and examine Trump's actual policy - unilateral tariffs on Chinese imports to counteract Chinese currency "manipulation" (aka the "Trump Tariff").  As you'll see, it's just as wrong.

2.  The Trump Tariff has major legal problems. 

First and most obviously, the President can't just slap a tariff on Chinese goods.  The US Constitution (Article I, Section 8) gives Congress the sole authority to impose tariffs on foreign-made goods (i.e., "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations"), so Trump would have to get congressional approval for his big China plan.   But considering that the most protectionist Congress in the last 20 years couldn't even pass legislation making currency undervaluation an illegal subsidy (and fretted for months over the WTO-consistency of the bill), does Trump really think that this new Congress - and its gaggle of free trade-supporting freshman - would agree to his plan?  Highly unlikely.

Second, there are several US laws that govern the imposition of remedial tariffs on Chinese (and other) imports, and these laws have strict procedural, evidentiary and substantive requirements that can't just be ignored.  Illegally subsidized imports from China (and other countries) are governed by the US countervailing duty law, while market-distorting surges in Chinese imports may be addressed under Section 421 (a China-specific safeguard).  President's Trump's remedial tariff would totally (and unlawfully) circumvent these laws.

Finally, the Trump Tariff would be inconsistent with two of the United States' most fundamental obligations under the WTO agreements: (i) Most Favored Nation (GATT Article I - the principle that a WTO Member must treat imports from all other Members equally) and (ii) the United States' tariff bindings (GATT Article II - the rule that a WTO Member cannot impose tariffs above the "bound rate" set forth in its tariff schedule).  Such a blatant violation of WTO rules would have serious consequences for the United States, as we'll discuss next.

3.  The Trump Tariff is economically ignorant.

Even assuming that Trump somehow convinced Congress to impose the Trump Tariff, its effects wouldn't be anything like Trump hoped or planned.  In fact, the tariff would end up causing a lot of pain (for both China and the US) for little or no economic gain.   First, as noted above, the Trump Tariff is blatantly WTO-inconsistent, so China would go straight to the WTO and easily win the right to impose retaliatory tariffs on US exports in the amount of the damage caused by the tariff.  Based on 2010 stats, the retaliation would be something like 25% (the proposed tariff level) of about $365 billion (total Chinese imports), or about $91 billion.  Considering that US exports to China totaled only about $100 billion in 2010, this WTO-legal retaliation would effectively close the United States' third largest export market - a devastating result for one of American exporters' fastest-growing markets (US exports to China have more than doubled since 2005).

Second, the economic pain wouldn't stop with US exporters because the Trump Tariff, just like any other consumption tax, would inevitably increase US prices of everything that American consumers currently buy from China.  Remember, US importers, not Chinese exporters, pay US tariffs and pass those on to American consumers.  This, of course, means that American families, many of whom are already struggling to get by, would end up paying more - a LOT more - for food, clothing, electronics, Smithsonian souvenirs, and everything else that now says "Made in China."  However, individuals wouldn't be the only ones screwed by the Trump Tariff - American businesses (and their many workers) would also be hit hard.  Because almost half of what we import from China is industrial supplies and materials or non-automotive capital goods - i.e., inputs used by American companies - lots and lots of these firms would inevitably pay more for the things that they need to remain globally competitive.  These higher costs, of course, also mean fewer employees, if not outright bankruptcy.  Awesome.

Third, it's highly unlikely that the Trump Tariff would lead to a significant increase in US manufacturing.  Sure, a few directly competitive US companies would benefit from that sweet, sweet import protection (by being able to milk US consumers for more money, natch), but the far more likely result is trade diversion - i.e., our imports would shift from China to other (more expensive) foreign countries like Vietnam, India or Mexico.  This is exactly what happened when the US imposed tariffs on Chinese tires under Section 421, and it's the very common result in anti-dumping and CVD cases.

Finally, even if the Trump Tariff succeeded in getting China to rapidly appreciate its currency (and, as noted below, it won't), it's far from certain that such appreciation would harm China's global competitiveness.  As Cato's Dan Ikenson stated last year: "RMB appreciation not only bolsters the buying power of Chinese consumers, but it makes Chinese-based producers and assemblers even more competitive because the relative prices of their imported inputs fall, reducing their costs of production. That reduction in cost can be passed on to foreign consumers in the form of lower export prices, which could mitigate entirely the intended effect of the currency adjustment, which is to reduce U.S. imports from China."  As an intermediate producer and big assembly hub, China is importing more these days than they did during the last period (2005-2008) of nominal currency appreciation, so Ikenson's insights likely hold truer today than they did even a few short years ago.

In sum, the Trump Tariff would cause massive pain for very, very little gain.

4.  The Trump Tariff is strategically unsound.

Even if the Trump Tariff weren't legally and economically dubious, it's still an awful strategic play.  The idea that the Chinese government would just roll over and concede "defeat" in the face of President Trump's big, macho tariff is absurd.  First, Trump fails to grasp that the Chinese government would never, ever do anything that makes it appear weak in the face of American aggression.  Instead, retaliation, not concession, is the far more likely reaction (just as China did when President Obama imposed those tire tariffs), and such sinophobic chest-thumping would likely retard, not quicken, the gradual appreciation of the yuan that China needs to undertake.  Second, China's not nearly as dependent on the US market as Trump seems to think.  The EU is now China's biggest export market, and Chinese exports to the US represent under 30% of China's exports to its top 10 export destinations.  So while the US market is big and important, China has other options.  Third, China couldn't rapidly and dramatically appreciate its currency even if it wanted to because any such move would implode the Chinese - and by extension, global - economy.

But, you know, other than that, it's a fine plan.

5.  The Trump Tariff is immoral.

Leaving aside the Trump Tariff's legal, economic and strategic problems, perhaps most offensive is its immorality.  As noted above, one of the most obvious effects of the Trump Tariff would be higher prices for American consumers. Trump even seems to recognize this obvious fact, and when asked about it he calmly explained:

But that's a risk Trump is willing to take. He says his son can live with fewer toys, as long as jobs come back to the United States.

"I have a son, and he loves little airplanes ... Most of them are made in China ... He has so many of 'em," Trump told CNBC's Larry Kudlow last month. "If he had half of 'em, and if they were made in this country, I'd be very happy ... and he'd be just as happy."

Other than the fact that those jobs wouldn't come "back to the United States," this kind of statement is mind-blowingly insulting, even for someone like Trump.  As I've repeatedly explained on this blog, tariffs are regressive taxes that harm poor Americans far more than wealthy ones like Donald Trump because they force the former to pay a bigger share of their (much smaller) paychecks for basic necessities like food, clothing and shelter.  Tariffs on Chinese products are even more problematic because lower income Americans buy a lot more Chinese stuff than rich Americans.  In short, when prices at Walmart go up, Donald Trump doesn't notice, but a working mom sure does.  And the only ones who benefit from those higher prices are a few well-connected American manufacturers and their workers.  Nice.

And this gets back to the brazenness of Trump's "toys" statement: sure, he can tolerate his son only having 10 higher-priced toys instead of 20 Chinese-made toys, but what about the dad who can currently afford only one toy for his son?  Last time I checked, he can't buy half a toy (or tire or shirt or TV or whatever), so for many lower income American families, the Trump Tariff doesn't mean ten fewer toys, it means no toys (or tires or shirts or TVs or whatever).

Stay classy, Donald.


6.  The Trump Tariff is the exact opposite of fiscally conservative, libertarian or "Republican."

A lot of people have dismantled Trump's born again conservativism by noting how he until very recently supported things like universal health care and eminent domain abuse, but his protectionism is just as bad or worse.  Indeed, it's the height of statist redistributionism.  Trump forgets that American consumers are buying Chinese goods voluntarily - last time I checked China wasn't loading missiles with TVs and launching them into the US (although that would be kinda awesome).  And he freely admits that the goal of his policy is to force American businesses and families to subsidize (by paying higher prices) that small minority of American manufacturers who directly compete with China.  So not only is Trump saying that he knows better than us about what we should be consuming, but Trump's also saying that because we just can't help ourselves but buy cheap Chinese goods ("ooh, they're so cheap and pastic-y"), he has no choice but to enlist the full force of the US government to stop us from harming ourselves.  President Trump will tell us to pay more for less in order to line the pockets of a select few because we're just too dumb and helpless, and we can't be trusted to make the decisions that he, and he alone, deems "right."

It's for our own good, you see.  Now please someone, anyone, explain to me how this is the policy of a fiscal conservative?

(Answer: it's not.)

Look, the truth is that China presents some real challenges for American businesses and the US government, and they should both continue to smartly and lawfully pressure China to reform its troublesome policies (while getting the United States' own messy house in order).  But it's absurd to think that the Great Red Menace is coming to steal our jobs and eat our lunches.  In reality, China's economy is at a very precarious point, and if the Chinese government doesn't find a way to change course, the country's headed for a Japan-style collapse, as this recent article made clear.  But, hey, maybe that fact explains why Trump, while (fake) contemplating the presidency back in 1990, said the exact same things about Japan that he's saying about China today.

Then again, maybe just like 1990, Trump's once again pulling a fast one on all of us and is just sopping up some free publicity in order to hawk his ties board game cologne TV show.  Unfortunately, even if Trump's candidacy is a joke (and I still think it probably is), his China "policy" has gained real traction among the American public and some influential conservative pundits.

And that's far more disturbing than Trump's current poll numbers.